Abstract
There certainly was a major reconsideration concerning the nuclear aspects of this American Grand Design. But despite the surprising rate of change, especially in American policy terms, it came too late to save the idea from being shattered by de Gaulle’s veto.
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Notes and References
See W. L. Kohl, French Nuclear Diplomacy, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 217–36.
See William D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, (New York: Harper, 1960);
Donald G. Brennan, Strategie der Abrüstung, achtundzwanzig Problemanalysen, (Hamburg: Bertelsmann, 1964);
Henry Kissinger, The Necessity of Choice, Prospects of American Foreign Policy, (New York: Chatto & Windus, 1960);
William W. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy, (New York: Harper & Row, 1964);
Robert McNamara, The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1968);
Curtis E. LeMay and Dale O. Smith. America is in Danger, (New York: 1968).
NA: DoS, CF/110.11, RU/2012, memcon between Rusk and de Gaulle on 19 June 1962, tel. SECTO 13, Paris, 20 June 1963, 10 p.m. (Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, vol. XIII, edited by Charles S. Sampson, James E. Miller and Glenn W. LaFantasie, (Washington: GPO, 1994), pp. 718–24).
Francois Seydoux, Beiderseits des Rheins, Erinnerungen eines französischen Diplomaten, (Paris/Bonn: Grasset, 1975), pp. 292–5.
Richard E. Neustadt, Alliance Politics, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 110.
PRO: PREM11/4229, instructions from Macmillan to Ormsby Gore, 14 December 1962. Theodore C. Sorensen, Kennedy, (New York: Hodder & Stoughton, 1965), p. 568. He recalls that it was a matter of 30 minutes for Kennedy and Ormsby-Gore to thrash out their solution on the plane to Nassau: the Skybolt programme should be continued and the costs split up between the two states.
George Wildman Ball, The Past has another Pattern, memoirs, (New York: Norton, 1982), pp. 267–9. When Kennedy showed Macmillan later that afternoon his draft letter to de Gaulle, the Prime Minister dropped even his lukewarm response and ‘offered no comments on this message’ (as his own records would later put it). PRO: PREM11/4229.
Ormsby-Gore therefore regarded Nassau a SABU (‘Slight Adjustable Balls-Up’) rather than a SNAFU (‘Serious Non-Adjustable F – Up’). Lord Harlech, ‘Suez SNAFU, Skybolt SABU’, Foreign Policy, No. 2, (1971), pp. 38–50.
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© 2000 Oliver Bange
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Bange, O. (2000). Kennedy Reconsiders the American Offer. In: The EEC Crisis of 1963. Contemporary History in Context. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230286276_6
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