Skip to main content

The Main Obstacle: de Gaulle

  • Chapter
The EEC Crisis of 1963

Part of the book series: Contemporary History in Context ((CHIC))

  • 16 Accesses

Abstract

It soon became apparent that de Gaulle was the major obstacle to a successful British bid to enter the European Communities.1

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 84.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes and References

  1. The hypothesis that the final Non by de Gaulle on 4 January 1963, was not a result of the negotiations, not even of Rambouillet and Nassau, has already been elaborated by Piers Dixon, Double Diploma: The Life of Sir Pierson Dixon, Don and Diplomat, (London: Hutchinson, 1968), pp. 300–5.

    Google Scholar 

  2. See also Alan Sked, Time for Principle, (London: The Bruges Group, 1992).

    Google Scholar 

  3. Edgar Pisani, French agricultural minister, to his British colleague, Christopher Soames, in 1961. Bernard Ledwidge, De Gaulle, (Paris: Flammarion, 1982), p. 301.

    Google Scholar 

  4. The following quotations are taken from Edmond Jouve, Le General de Gaulle et la Construction de l’Europe (1944–1966), Vol. 1 and 2, (Paris: LGDJ, 1967);

    Google Scholar 

  5. and Lord Gladwyn, De Gaulle’s Europe Or Why The General Says No, (London: Secker & Warburg, 1969).

    Google Scholar 

  6. See also Philip G. Cerny, The Politics of Grandeur, Ideological Aspects of De Gaulle’s Foreign Policy, (Cambridge: University Press, 1980).

    Google Scholar 

  7. Paul Reynaud, The Foreign Policy of Charles De Gaulle, (New York: Odyssey Press, 1964), p. 51. For de Gaulle’s relationship with Debré see also Institut Charles de Gaulle, De Gaulle et ses premiers ministres, colloque organisé par le ICDG, Paris 1990.

    Google Scholar 

  8. Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle, Vol. 3, Le Souverain, (Paris: Le Seuil, 1986).

    Google Scholar 

  9. Gladwyn, p. 54. See also Institut Charles de Gaulle, Approches de la philosophie politique du Général de Gaulle, Paris, 1983.

    Google Scholar 

  10. William Pickles, ‘Making Sense of De Gaulle’, International Affairs, Vol. 42, No. 3, (1966), pp. 410–20. For the EEC Commission’s knowledge about de Gaulle’s position see Hans von der Groeben, ‘Charles de Gaulle et l’integration européenne’, Institut Charles de Gaulle, De Gaulle en son siècle, Actes des Journées internationales tenues à l’Unesco, Paris 19–24 Novembre 1990, Paris 1993, vol. 5, pp. 94–101.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  11. This contradicts Ionescu’s characterisation of these years as a ‘period of antithesis’. Ghita Ionescu, Leadership in an Interdependent World: The Statemanship of Adenauer, De Gaulle, Thatcher, Reagan and Gorbachev, (Harlow: Longman, 1991).

    Google Scholar 

  12. John Pinder, Europe Against De Gaulle, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1963), p. 39.

    Google Scholar 

  13. Jean-Raymond Tournoux, Jamais Dit, (Paris: Plon, 1971), p. 193.

    Google Scholar 

  14. This point was fully endorsed by de Gaulle on 17 July 1961. De Gaulle, Lettres, notes et carnets, Janvier 1961–Décembre 1968, (Paris: Plon 1986), pp. 107–8.

    Google Scholar 

  15. Michel Debré, Gouverner, mémoires, Vol. 3 (1958–62), (Paris: Albin Michel, 1985);

    Google Scholar 

  16. Charles de Gaulle, Mémoires d’espoir, Le renouveau 1958–1962, (Paris: Plon, 1970).

    Google Scholar 

  17. Charles de Gaulle, Lettres, notes et carnets, June 1958–Décembre 1960, (Paris: Plon, 1985), pp. 398–9.

    Google Scholar 

  18. Pierre Maillard, De Gaulle et l’Allemagne, Le rêve inachevé, (Paris: Plon, 1990), p. 184. Horst Osterheld held it to be highly possible. In his opinion Adenauer would have agreed [in the pursuit of both goals, the EPU and the preservation of the Communities]. But in his mind, the Dutch document contained a number of inadequacies: firstly, de Gaulle as the French President would never have signed a treaty with a private person, however much this person claimed to be Europe’s speaker. Secondly, it grossly overestimated Monnet’s influence on Adenauer. According to Osterheld, Adenauer liked to listen to, and especially squabble with, Monnet, but usually came to other conclusions.

    Google Scholar 

  19. Max Kohnstamm confirmed to the author that a secret meeting between de Gaulle and Monnet took place, and that this was Monnet’s policy until de Gaulle withdrew the Fouchet II memorandum for a European Political Union in early 1962. François Duchêne, Monnet’s private secretary at the time, also confirmed the secret meeting, but thought that it ended without results. Conversation with the author at the Cambridge Conference, July 1993. François Duchêne, Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence, (New York: Norton, 1994), pp. 318–9.

    Google Scholar 

  20. Edward A. Kolodziej, French International Policy under De Gaulle and Pompidou – The Politics of Grandeur, (Cornell: University Press, 1978), chapter 5.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Copyright information

© 2000 Oliver Bange

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Bange, O. (2000). The Main Obstacle: de Gaulle. In: The EEC Crisis of 1963. Contemporary History in Context. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230286276_3

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics