Abstract
The end of the negotiations thus did not mean an end to conceptual conflicts. In fact, the three events of January 1963 (the veto, the Franco–German Treaty, and the MLF initiative) highlighted the state of the West and the differing conceptions of its future.1
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Notes and References
Oliver Bange, ‘Grand Designs and the Diplomatic Breakdown’, in George Wilkes (ed.), Britain’s Failure to Enter the European Community 1961–1963: The Enlargement Negotiations and Crises in European, Atlantic and Commonwealth Relations (London: Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 191–212.
Quoted in Gustav Schmidt, ‘Die politischen und sicherheitspolitischen Dimensionen der britischen Europapolitik 1955/56 bis 1963/64’, in his Großbritannien und Europa – Großbritannien in Europa (Universitätsverlag: Bochum, 1989), p. 230.
Frank, Costigliola, ‘The Pursuit of Atlantic Community: Nuclear Arms, Dollars, and Berlin’, in Thomas G. Paterson (ed.), Kennedy’s Quest for Victory, American Foreign Policy, 1961–1963 (Oxford: University Press, 1989);
Sean Greenwood, Britain and European Cooperation since 1945 (Blackwell: Oxford, 1992), p. 90.
Anthony Sampson, Macmillan: A Study in Ambiguity (London: Penguin, 1967), p. 223.
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© 2000 Oliver Bange
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Bange, O. (2000). Conclusion. In: The EEC Crisis of 1963. Contemporary History in Context. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230286276_17
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230286276_17
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