Anglo-American Co-ordination towards a Breakdown in Brussels

Abstract

This chapter is divided into two major parts. The British perspective of the events has already been discussed in the context of the ministerial meeting in Brussels. It has been argued that it was on this occasion that the key decision-makers on the British side in London and Brussels abandoned their hopes of accession. Instead they adopted a tactic of taking the greatest possible advantage of the expected breakdown. The first part of this chapter will therefore concentrate on the situation in Washington after de Gaulle’s veto. Their lack of preparation, subsequent mistakes and the impression that the fundamentals of their European policy had been eroded had resulted in a sense of hopelessness. Their utterly bleak outlook only improved slightly on the occasion of Monnet’s visit, which seemed to hold out the prospect of an organised European opposition to de Gaulle. Such a pessimistic mood in turn set the mould for things to come: the American inclination to follow a British lead over a ‘useful’ breakdown in Brussels and their paranoia over the Franco-German Treaty.