Abstract
Almost all scholars and journalists who have so far written on this topic have tended to see the events of January 1963 as a dramatic climax – Britain’s EEC application. Their work is written from a dominant Anglo-American perspective. Consequently it depicts the breakdown as a carefully planned, intentionally rupturous, and therefore almost evil, Gaullist plot to keep Britain out of Europe and allocate the dominant position therein to France. The British and American governments are usually described as taken by surprise. As the French tactics were successful and Great Britain was left little more than an island off the European shores, others’ accounts stop here.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Notes and References
See Michael Charlton, ‘How and Why Britain Lost the Leadership of Europe’, parts 1 and 2, Encounter, Vol. 57, No. 2 and 3, (1981), pp. 8–22 and 22–33;
Simon Burgess and Geoffrey Edwards, ‘The Six Plus One: British Policy-Making and the Question of European Economic Integration, 1955’, International Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 3 (1988), pp. 393–413.
Copyright information
© 2000 Oliver Bange
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Bange, O. (2000). Introduction. In: The EEC Crisis of 1963. Contemporary History in Context. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230286276_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230286276_1
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-39958-1
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-28627-6
eBook Packages: Palgrave Political & Intern. Studies CollectionPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)