Abstract
The roots of the Balfour Declaration lay in perceptions of Jews and ethnicity in the British Government, and the policy-making elite’s tendency to use nationalism as the means of capturing the perceived power of ethnic groups. By themselves, however, perceptions and tendencies were not sufficient for the development of a pro-Zionist policy. The evolution of the Balfour Declaration depended upon the opportunities that were thrown up by the circumstances of the war and the changing needs of policy-makers. As the financial and material support of neutral countries increased in importance, and the military situation on the Western front deteriorated, propaganda became ever more significant, particularly in the USA. As with other ethnic groups, this thrust the Jewish question onto the agenda in the Foreign Office. The possibility of an Allied military campaign in the Near East and the end of the Ottoman Empire also threw open the future of Palestine. Together, these conditions made the advance of a British Zionist policy possible. Even in these circumstances, however, the Anglo-Zionist alliance was not a foregone conclusion. The last critical element was that of human agency, on both the British and Zionist sides. It was undoubtedly of great significance that civil servants and politicians who were pre-disposed to the idea of a Zionist policy were in positions of influence.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
See Bernard Wasserstein, Herbert Samuel: A Political Life (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), pp. 200–211.
Friedman, Question of Palestine, pp. 19–21; V.H. Rothwell, British War Aims and Peace diplomacy 1914–1918 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), pp. 26–27.
See, for example, C.P. Scott to Lloyd George, (?) June 1915, 27 Oct. 1915, Lloyd George Papers, PA, LG/D/18/15/2; Diary of C.P. Scott (Typescript Copy), 8 and 22 May, 26 July 1916, Guardian Archive, John Rylands University Library, The University of Manchester [hereafter JRUL]. On his scientific work, see, Jehuda Reinharz, ‘Science in the Service of Politics: The Case of Chaim Weizmann During the First World War’, English Historical Review, 100, 396 (July 1985), pp. 572–600.
Kallen used the secret Zionist fraternity organization, the Parushim, which he had founded in 1913, to this end. Sara Schmidt, Horace M. Kallen: Prophet of American Zionism (New York: Carlson, 1995), p. 81.
Kallen to Weizmann, 16 Dec. 1915, Harry Barnard Papers, Box 1, American Jewish Archives, Cincinnati [hereafter AJA]; Ben Halpern, A Clash of Heroes: Brandeis, Weizmann and American Zionism (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 153–155
Horace Kallen, ‘Democracy versus the Melting-Pot: A Study of American Nationality’, The Nation, 100 (18 Feb., 1915) in Werner Sollors (ed.), Theories of Ethnicity: A Classical Reader (London: Macmillan, 1996), p. 91.
Mark Levene, ‘Lucien Wolf: Crypto-Zionist, Anti-Zionist or Opportunist par-excellence?’, Studies in Zionism, 12, 2 (Autumn 1991), pp. 137–141.
On the Congress, see Jonathan Frankel, ‘The Jewish Socialists and the American Jewish Congress Movement’, in Ezra Mendelsohn (ed.), Essays on the American Jewish Labor Movement, YIVO Annual of Jewish Social Science, 16 (1976), pp. 202–257
On his diplomatic skills during the war, also see Sanders, High Walls, p. 427; Shmuel Katz, Lone Wolf: A Biography of Vladimir (Ze’ev) Jabotinsky, Volume I (New York: Barricade Books, 1996)
Ibid., pp. 163–168; Joseph Schechtman, Rebel and Statesman: The Vladimir Jabotinsky Story, Vol. I (New York: T. Yoseloff, 1956), pp. 207–215.
Levene, War, Jews, and the New Europe, p. 97. On French aims in Palestine see, Christopher M. Andrew and A.S. Kanya-Forstner, France Overseas: The Great War and the Climax of French Imperial Expansion (London: Thames and Hudson, 1981), pp. 74–77
It has been argued that Sykes was drawn to the benefits of Zionism by Captain Reginald Hall, the Director of Navy Intelligence. Friedman, Question of Palestine, pp. 110–112, 119; Jacob Rosen, ‘Captain Reginald Hall and the Balfour Declaration’, Middle Eastern Studies, 14, 1 (1988), pp. 56–67.
Josef Fraenkel, ‘Chaim Weizmann and Haham Moses Gaster’, in Raphael Patai (ed.), Herzl Year Book: Essays in Zionist History and Thought, Vol. VI (New York: Herzl Press, 1964–1965), pp. 183–237
Diary of Moses Gaster, 10 May and 7 July, 1916, cited in Stein, Balfour Declaration, n. 10 and 11, p. 288. Also see François Georges-Picot, ‘Les Origines de la Déclaration Balfour’, La Question D’Israel, Année 17(1 Sept. 1939), p. 677.
For example, he sent Sykes a copy of Zionism and the Jewish Future, which he quickly proceeded to read. Gaster to Sykes, 24 May 1916, Copies from the Sledmere Papers, WA; and Sykes to Gaster, 5 July 1916, Gaster Papers, CZA, A203/228. The book in question was a collection of essays by Zionists that portrayed the sum of Jewish history and life in the Diaspora through the prism of Zionist ideology. Harry Sacher (ed.), Zionism and the Jewish Future (London: John Murray, 1916).
‘Minutes of a meeting held at 10 Downing Street on December 28, 1916’, Papers of John Campbell Davidson, PA, DAV/46; Rothwell, British War Aims, p. 128; David Woodward, Lloyd George and the Generals (Newark and London: University of Delaware Press and Associated University Press, 1983), p. 128.
Stuart A. Cohen, English Zionists and British Jews: The Communal Politics of Anglo-Jewry, 1895–1920 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 110–113.
Diary of Gaster, 30 Jan. 1917, quoted in Stein, Balfour Declaration, p. 367; Gaster to Jacob De Haas, 31 Jan. 1917, Gaster Papers, CZA, A203/268; Stein, Balfour Declaration, p. 368; Gaster to Sykes, 1 Feb. 1917, Gaster Papers, CZA, A203/279. The only evidence that Sykes had decided to seek out alternatives to Gaster is a record of a conversation between Sykes and Aaron Aaronsohn in April 1917. 27 Apr. 1917, Diary of Aaron Aaronsohn, quoted in Anthony Venier (ed.), Agents of Empire: Anglo-Zionist Intelligence Operations 1915–1919: Brigadier Walter Gribbon, Aaron Aaronsohn and the NILI Ring (London and Washington: Brassey’s Ltd, 1995), p. 260.
Copyright information
© 2007 James Renton
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Renton, J. (2007). Turning Perceptions into Policy: The Role of Jewish Activists, 1914–1917. In: The Zionist Masquerade. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230286139_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230286139_4
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-36156-4
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-28613-9
eBook Packages: Palgrave History CollectionHistory (R0)