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The Continuing Diversity of Corporate Governance Regimes: France and Britain Compared

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Corporate Governance and International Business

Part of the book series: The Academy of International Business ((AIB))

Abstract

Corporate governance has been defined as ‘the system by which companies are directed and controlled’ (Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992: 15), or more specifically as ‘the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment’ (Schleifer and Vishny, 1997: 737). Such definitions, however, do not address the pluralism of corporate governance regimes, reflected, for example, in the growing number of national codes. The past decade has witnessed extraordinary global change, driven by heightened competition, and characterized by extensive corporate restructuring across national boundaries. At the same time, partly as a corollary of this, there is an increasing focus on matters of corporate responsibility, accountability and transparency. Internationalization has raised questions regarding the extent to which best practice may be transported, or transplanted, from one national business system to another (Cheffins, 2001a; Djelic, 1998; Whitley, 1999), spawning numerous studies on the likelihood of international convergence (Carati and Tourani Rad, 2000; Peck and Ruigrok, 2000; Rhodes and van Apeldoorn, 1998; Toms and Wright, 2005). Yet, as Aguilera and Jackson (2003: 447) observe, the diversity of corporate governance practices around the world is such as almost to defy a common definition.

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Authors
  1. Mairi Maclean
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  2. Charles Harvey
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. King’s College London, UK

    Roger Strange (Senior Lecturer in Economics) & Gregory Jackson (Reader in Strategy and Comparative Management) (Senior Lecturer in Economics) &  (Reader in Strategy and Comparative Management)

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© 2008 Mairi Maclean and Charles Harvey

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Maclean, M., Harvey, C. (2008). The Continuing Diversity of Corporate Governance Regimes: France and Britain Compared. In: Strange, R., Jackson, G. (eds) Corporate Governance and International Business. The Academy of International Business. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230285743_12

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