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Tensions Between Economic Policies, Technology and Bankers’ Professional Perceptions

  • Jocelyn Pixley
Part of the Palgrave Macmillan Studies in Banking and Financial Institutions book series (SBFI)

Abstract

Risk management can never achieve perfection.’ Alan Greenspan, former chair of the US Federal Reserve (the Fed) wrote this after the credit crisis broke. He still has faith in risk management, saying problems lay not with regulators’ inaction, but with the people using products like derivatives, who became ‘greedy’ and dishonourably peddled them. He implies they lacked the integrity and reliability of ‘the pharmacist who fills out the prescription ordered by our physician’.1 This typical moral argument embodies one of the tensions explored here. The logic is that technical risk models would be perfect were it not for their abuse by people.

Keywords

Monetary Policy Central Bank House Price Federal Reserve Pension Fund 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Jocelyn Pixley 2010

Authors and Affiliations

  • Jocelyn Pixley
    • 1
  1. 1.Global Policy InstituteLondon Metropolitan UniversityUK

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