Abstract
No major power embraces the concept of a multipolar world order as fully as Russia does. Nor does any go as far in its rhetorical efforts to revise the unipolar global structure. Since the mid-1990s, Russia has declared an abiding ambition to replace the US-dominated international order with a multipolar one, in which emerging powers — with Russia in the vanguard — would join the highest ranks of the global system. Increasingly, multipolarity has informed the intellectual foundations of Russian thinking about international relations and, in turn, influenced the shape and content of foreign policy. It has served as Moscow’s measuring stick for gauging Russian power relative to that of its competitors, not unlike the Soviet Union’s notion of the ‘correlation of East-West forces’. And it is viewed in Moscow as the best, if not the only, hedge against the emergence of narrow US-Chinese bipolarity, which could challenge and greatly circumscribe Russia.2
Phrase, ‘shortcut to greatness’, attributed to Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko. While their article specifically analyses the Gorbachev era, this article builds on and adapts their idea to the Putin era. From here on, the concept of Russian shortcuts and the expression, ‘shortcut to greatness’, are credited to them. See: Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, ‘Shortcut to Greatness: The New Thinking and the Revolution in Soviet Foreign Policy’, International Organization, 57 (Winter 2003): 77–109.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
Dmitri Trenin stresses Russia’s ambivalence about China’s potential to dominate Russia. Dmitri Trenin: ‘Russia’s Threat Perception and Strategic Posture’ ( 25 January 2008 ), Carnegie Moscow Centre, www.carnegie.ru.
On Western mistakes and Russia’s luck: Sergei Karaganov, ‘A New Epoch of Confrontation’, Russia in Global Affairs, No. 4 (October–December 2007).
John Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future’, International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Summer 1990): 2–3.
We should point out that China was embraced by the West, while Russia was not. On China’s subsequent rejection of multipole diplomacy: Christophe Jaffelot, Jean-Philippe Beja, Julie Newton, ‘Cooperation or Collusion?: Russia, India and China in the 21st Century’, The American University of Paris, Conference Series (February–April 2008 ).
Sergei Lavrov, ‘Forget the Inferiority Complex’, Argumenty i fakty (13 April 2005), JRL (13 April 2005 ), http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson
Historically, ‘Russia’s tendency to fall behind in achieving the economic, scientific and technological benefits of globalisation revealed its weaknesses, which Russia’s leaders then sought to redress primarily through military and political means in its foreign policy’: Celeste Wallender, ‘What can Multipolarity’, in Robert Legvold, ed., Russian Foreign Policy in the Twenty-first Century and the Shadow of the Past ( New York: Columbia University Press, 2007 ), p. 444.
Evgeni Primakov, Gody v bolshoi politike [The Years in Big Politics] ( Moscow: Sovershenno Sekretno, 1999 ), pp. 212–15.
Julie Newton, Russia, France, and the Idea of Europe ( Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003 ), p. 239.
Term and question attributed to: Robert Legvold, ‘Russian Foreign Policy during Periods of Great State Transformation’, in Robert Legvold, ed., Russian Foreign Policy in the 21st Century and the Shadow of the Past (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), pp. 77–144, esp. 78, 131.
Richard Pipes, by stressing the deep roots and strength of Russian authoritarianism throughout its history, offers little hope that Russia can overcome that legacy in order to build enduring great power. Richard Pipes, Russian Conservatism and its Critics ( New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007 )
Russian mentality and behaviour change slowly, if at all, over time, regardless of the regime in power’: Richard Pipes, ‘Flight from Freedom: What Russians Think and Want’, Foreign Affairs (May/June 2004): 9–15.
Lilia Shevtsova puts particular stress on institutional weaknesses: Putin’s system (the roots laid by Yeltsin) is an ‘electoral monarchy’ atop ‘bureaucratic capitalism’, and is unsustainable, she claims. This type of system, if it retains its grasp on Russia, could lead Russia either to dictatorship or decay: Shevtsova, Lost in Transition: The Yeltsin and Putin Legacies (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007), pp. 107–11, 23. Others agree that this system has deep institutional weaknesses, but do not go so far as to suggest that this system cannot last. On the contrary, writers in this volume such as Ken Wilson, suggest Russia, like Mexico, could go on to be ruled by the same political party for years.
Dmitri Trenin, Getting Russia Right ( Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2007 ).
Russian foreign policy is geared to the fundamental goal of redoing Russia as a great power in modern conditions’. Hanna Smith, ‘What can Multipolarity and Multilateralism Tell Us about Russian Foreign Policy Interests’, in Hanna Smith (ed.), Russia and its Foreign Policy: Influences, Interests and Issues (Helsinki: Kikomora Publications, 2005), p. 36. Also: ‘Russia has residual superpower mentality’
Dmitri Trenin, ‘Russia redefines itself and its relations with the West’, The Washington Quarterly (1 March 2007), http://www.carnegie.ru/eng/print/75857-print.htm.
Vladimir Putin, ‘Russia at the Turn of the Millenium’, in First Person: An Astonishingly Frank Self Portrait by Russia’s President ( Moscow: Vargrius, 2000 ), p. 214.
Marshall Poe, The Russian Moment in World History ( Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003 ), p. 66.
Michael McFaul, ‘New Russia, New Threat’, Los Angeles Times (2 October 2007 ), www.carnegie.ru/en/print/76877.
Vladimir Putin, ‘Tver Meeting with Members of Youth Organisation’ (24 July 2007 ), www.kremlin.ru.
Vladimir Putin, ‘Speech…of National Unity Day’, Grand Kremlin Palace (4 November 2007 ), www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2007/11/04/09.
Vladimir Putin, ‘Speech at the 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy’ (10 February 2007), Putin’s sharp comments dovetailed with the views of a wide range of elites, who shared his views of the West as actively anti-Russian. Even Alexei Arbatov, a liberal-minded international affairs specialist and former Deputy Chairman of the Duma’s Defence Committee, accused the West of meddling in Ukrainian and Georgian politics. He linked the colour revolutions in both Ukraine and Georgia to ‘the West’s active intervention…in Georgia and Ukraine in support of the most anti-Russian politicians in 2004–2006
Alexei Arbatov, ‘Moscow and Munich: A New Framework for Russian Domestic and Foreign Policies’, Working Papers No. 3 (2007), Carnegie Moscow Centre, p. 16.
Sergei Lavrov, ‘Stenogramma vystupleniya i otvetov na voprosy Ministra Innostrannykh Del Rossii S.V. Lavrova na seminare… v Moskovskom Tsentre Karnegi… 21 Iyunya 2007’ (21 June 2007 ), http://www.mid.ru/2fee282eb6df40e643256999005e6e8c/7d38603flcb584c
Dmitri Trenin: ‘Russia’s Threat Perception and Strategic Posture’ ( 25 January 2008 ), Carnegie Moscow Centre, http://www.carnegie.ru.
Cited by: Anne de Tinguy, Conference, ‘Le Projet de Puissance de la Russie: Enjeux, Réalites, et Implications Stratégiques’, Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (2 October 2007 ), 85.
Vladimir Putin, ‘Valdai International Discussion Group’, Sochi (14 September 2007), www.kremlin.ru/engtext/speeches/2007/09/14/18. Emphasis added.
Alfred Rieber, ‘The Reforming Tradition in Russian History’, in A. Rieber, A. Rubinstein, ed., Perestroika at the Crossroads (M. E. Sharpe, 1991 ), p. 13.
Jeff Kahn, ‘What is the New Russian Federalism?’, in Archie Brown, ed., Contemporary Russian Politics: A Reader (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 374, 379.
Vladimir Putin, ‘Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation’ (25 April 2005 ), http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2005/04/25.
Putin referred to Russia’s ‘time of troubles’ four centuries ago, and suggestively praised those who ended them: Vladimir Putin, ‘Speech at the State Reception devoted to National Unity Day’, The Kremlin (4 November 2006), http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2006/11/04
In another speech (quoted in Moscow News), Putin referred explicitly to the Yeltsin period as Russia’s most recent ‘time of troubles’ and suggested his (Putin’s) leadership had led Russia out of its troubles: Anna Arutunyan, ‘Putin Plans for New Role’, Moscow News (4 October 2007).
Vladimir Putin, ‘Speech at the Reception on the Occasion of National Unity Day’, The Kremlin (4 November 2007 ), http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2007/11/04/09.
These efforts consolidated into a political/economic strategy in 2003–2004 as energy prices sky-rocketed. The strategy gained ideological overtones in the wake of Ukraine’s Orange Revolution in late 2004, early 2005. Andrei Denisov, ‘The Gains and Failures of Russia’s Energy Superpower’, Russia in Global Affairs, No. 2 (April–June 2008), http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/23/1197.html.
For an excellent discussion of Central Asia between the great powers: Robert Legvold, ‘Great Power Stakes in Central Asia’, Thinking Strategically: The Major Powers, Kazakhstan and the Central Asian Nexus ( Boston: MIT Press, 2004 ), pp. 1–38.
Jonathan Haslam, No Virtue like Necessity: Realist Thought from Machiavelli to the Present ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002 )
nuanced realist view: William Wohlforth, ‘The End of the Cold War as a Hard Case for Ideas’, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Spring 2005 ), pp. 165–73.
Jan-Werner Müller, ‘Introduction: The Power of Memory, the Memory of Power and the Power over Memory’, in Jan-Werner Müller, ed., Memory and Power in Post-War Europe ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press ), p. 18.
Robert English, ‘The Sociology of New Thinking’, Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Spring 2005), p. 74
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Relations ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000 ), pp. 336–43.
Julie Newton, ‘ForumduFuture’ Conference, Assemblée Nationale de France (23 June 2005); English, ‘The Sociology of New Thinking’, p. 74.
Iver B. Neumann, ‘Russia as a Great Power’, in J. Hedenskog, V. Konnander, B. Nygren, I. Oldberg, Pursiainen, ed., Russia as a Great Power ( London: Routledge, 2005 ), pp. 23–5.
Andrei Kozyrev, ‘Rossiya i SShA: Partnerstvo ne prezhdevremenno, a zapazdyvayet’, Izvestiya (11 March 1994), p. 3.
Andrei Kozyrev, ‘The Lagging Partnership’, Foreign Affairs 73, No. 3 (1994), 62–3
Elin Hellum, ‘Identity and Russian Foreign Policy: An Analysis of the Official Discourse, 1992–2004’, Mphil Thesis, St Antony’s College, Oxford (April 2005), p. 28.
Hanna Smith agrees: The ‘aspiration [for greatness] informs the Russian predilection for multipolarity, and this is a theme that appears in all forms of multipolarity in Russian foreign arguments from Kozyrev to Primakov, and Ivanov til Lavrov.’ See: Hannah Smith, ed., Russia and Its Foreign Policy (Saarijarvi, Finland: Kikimora Publications, 2005), p. 39 (emphasis added).
Dmitri Trenin, ‘Russia Redefines Itself and its Relations with the West’, The Washington Quarterly (1 March 2007 ), http://www.carnegie.ru/en/print/75857-print.htm.
Ivan Krastev, ‘Russia as the “Other Europe”’, Russia in Global Affairs, No. 4 (October/December 2007), http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/21/1151/html, 3–4.
Superpower… cheap’: Bendersky, ‘Russia’s Future Foreign Policy: Pragmatism in Motion’, Power and Interest News Report, PINR (4 May 2005) in JRL (4 May 2005), http://www.cdi.org/Russia/Johnson.
Vyacheslav Nikonov, ‘Russian Gaullism: Putin’s Foreign Policy Doctrine’, Russia Watch, No. 5, Harvard University (March 2001).
Robert Legvold, ‘Russia’s Unformed Foreign Policy’, Foreign Affairs (September/October 2001 ), http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20010901faessay5570/robertlegvold/russia-s-unformed-foreign-policy.
CIA World Fact Book, ‘Rank Order-GDP’, http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html; Michael S. Bernstam, Alvin Rabushka, ‘China vs. Russia: Wealth Creation vs. Poverty Reduction’, Hoover Institution (25 April 2005 ), http://www.hoover.org/research/russianecon/essays/5084951.html.
Informal spokesman’: Dmitri Trenin, ‘Russia’s Strategic Choices’, Policy Brief #50 (May 2007): 3, http://www.carnegie.ru.
On Asia as rear guard for Western-centric foreign policy, Bobo Lo, personal conversation. See: Lo, Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing and the New Geopolitics ( Washington: Brookings, 2008 ).
Fyodor Lyukyanov, ‘The Transition from Bipolar to Multipolar’ (23 January 2008), Moscow Times in Russia in Global Affairs, http://www.eng.globalaffairs.ru/engsmi/1167.html.
Sergei Lavrov, ‘Global Politics Needs Openness and Democracy’, Izvestiya, in Johnson’s Russia List (JRL), #100 (1 May 2007 ), http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson.
Fyodor Lyukyanov, Vedomosti (10 September 2007), 4 in Current Digest of Post Soviet Press, Vol. 59, No. 38 (2007): 4.
Ivan Kravstev, ‘Sovereign Democracy, Russian-Style’, OpenDemocracy (16 November 2006 ), http://www.opendemocracy.net/node/4104/print.
Mark Leonard, Nicu Popescu, Executive Summary, European Council on Foreign Relations (7 November 2007 ), http://www.ecfr.eu.
Given the UK’s prominence, the Kremlin was extremely sensitive about its criticisms. The ‘Obzor’ particularly singled out Britain for unusual and angry comment; the British Ambassador was harassed; and BP was squeezed. ‘Obzor’: 37–8; Mark Leonard, Nicu Popescu, ‘A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations’, Policy Paper, European Council on Foreign Relations (November 2007), http://www.ecfr.eu.org, 14–15.
Obzor’, p. 32; Vladimir Putin, ‘Press Statement and Answers… Following the 20th Russia-European Union Summit’, Mafra, Portugal (26 October 2007 ), www.kremlin.ru.
Mark Leonard, Nicu Popescu, ‘Russia and Europe’, European Council on Foreign Relations (7 November 2007), http://www.ecfr.eu/content/entry/commentary_russia.
Aleksei Arbatov, ‘Russia and the United States — Time to End the Strategic Deadlock’, Briefing, Vol. 10, Issue 3, Carnegie Moscow Centre (June 2008): 2.
Daniel Dombey, Demetri Sevastopulo, Neil Buckley, ‘Russians Accuse US of Military Expansion’, FT (9 February 2007 ), http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto020920071449264142&page=2.
Dmitri Litovkin, ‘Russia Explodes “Father of all Bombs”’, Izvestiya (13 September 2007) in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press (CDPSP), Vol. 59, No. 37 (2007): 8.
Sergei Karaganov, ‘The New Era: What is to be Done?’, Rossiiskaya Gazeta in CDPSP, Vol. 59, No. 38 (17 October 2007 ).
On these points, see: Archie Brown, Seven Years that Changed the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 248–51, 277–94
Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor ( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996 ), pp. 225–30.
Vladimir Gel’man and Tomila Lankina, ‘Authoritarian Versus Democratic Diffusions: Explaining Institutional Choices in Russia’s Local Government’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 24, 1 (2008): 40–62.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2010 Julie Newton
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Newton, J. (2010). Shortcut to Great Power: Russia in Pursuit of Multipolarity. In: Newton, J., Tompson, W. (eds) Institutions, Ideas and Leadership in Russian Politics. St Antony’s Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230282940_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230282940_5
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-36232-5
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-28294-0
eBook Packages: Palgrave Political & Intern. Studies CollectionPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)