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Shortcut to Great Power: Russia in Pursuit of Multipolarity

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Part of the book series: St Antony’s Series ((STANTS))

Abstract

No major power embraces the concept of a multipolar world order as fully as Russia does. Nor does any go as far in its rhetorical efforts to revise the unipolar global structure. Since the mid-1990s, Russia has declared an abiding ambition to replace the US-dominated international order with a multipolar one, in which emerging powers — with Russia in the vanguard — would join the highest ranks of the global system. Increasingly, multipolarity has informed the intellectual foundations of Russian thinking about international relations and, in turn, influenced the shape and content of foreign policy. It has served as Moscow’s measuring stick for gauging Russian power relative to that of its competitors, not unlike the Soviet Union’s notion of the ‘correlation of East-West forces’. And it is viewed in Moscow as the best, if not the only, hedge against the emergence of narrow US-Chinese bipolarity, which could challenge and greatly circumscribe Russia.2

Phrase, ‘shortcut to greatness’, attributed to Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko. While their article specifically analyses the Gorbachev era, this article builds on and adapts their idea to the Putin era. From here on, the concept of Russian shortcuts and the expression, ‘shortcut to greatness’, are credited to them. See: Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko, ‘Shortcut to Greatness: The New Thinking and the Revolution in Soviet Foreign Policy’, International Organization, 57 (Winter 2003): 77–109.

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Notes

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© 2010 Julie Newton

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Newton, J. (2010). Shortcut to Great Power: Russia in Pursuit of Multipolarity. In: Newton, J., Tompson, W. (eds) Institutions, Ideas and Leadership in Russian Politics. St Antony’s Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230282940_5

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