Negotiation, Rhetoric and Legitimacy in Multilateral Institutions

Abstract

Over the previous three chapters, the representation, influence and power of the EU in different international organisations of the multilateral system has been explored. Using Claude’s three ideal types of decision making (majoritarianism, consensus and privilege) as a prism to see multilateral organisations at work, we have generated new important evidence on the behaviour of the EU and its member states across the multilateral system, to show that it cannot be seen as a benign and positive influence in all circumstances and cases. Its report card has been mixed, and there are a number of lessons to be learnt from the exercise that we shall come to presently. As with any framework built on ideal types, actual practice often differs greatly, and without doubt it is impossible to think of a one-size-fits-all approach to studying the EU in the multilateral system. Frequently, international organisations employ composite decision- making structures that make their decision- making procedures highly varied according to their institutional evolution.

The argument that the voice of the Assembly may be regarded as an expression of the selfish will of an irresponsible majority, organized into a monolithic bloc, is the first resort of a permanent minority and the last resort of a majority which feels itself slipping into minority status.

–Claude 1984: 137