Consensus in Multilateral Institutions

Abstract

The second of Inis Claude’s three ideal types of decision making in international organisations is the egalitarianism of international law in which ‘every state has equal voice in international proceedings, and that no state can be bound without its consent’ (Claude 1984: 119). The logical implications of giving equal weight to ‘sovereign equality and sovereign immunity from externally imposed legislation’ imply demanding unanimity in all decisions taken between states (Claude 1984: 119). Both in the EU and in multilateral organisations more generally, unanimity equates to an effective veto power by each state over the others. In a perversion of the principle that unanimity means the rule of all by all, in effect ‘it confers upon a minority of one the procedural competence and the moral authority to determine policy in a negative fashion’ (Claude 1984: 125). The literature applying rational choice modelling to states bargaining in a unanimity–based decision–making system is divided into two camps, one asserting a pessimistic view that lowest common denominators tend to favour the status quo position, while the more optimistic suggesting that median outcomes are possible in the long–term (Koenig & Slapin 2006). The critics of unanimity have been around for a considerable length of time, dating back at least as far as Politis who stated that in international organisations, ‘the rule of unanimity may lead to paralysis and anarchy’ (Politis 1928, quoted in Claude 1984: 120).

The key problem in contemporary international decision-making is the divorce of power from voting majorities resulting from the expansion of membership in the international system. This renders majority voting increasingly useless for lawmaking decisions because of the danger of powerful alienated minorities. […] The need is for a technique that will ensure very broadly based support for decisions in a highly divided system, and it is on this ground that consensus exercises its appeal.

–Buzan 1981: 326