Explaining Cross-National Patterns

Abstract

Existing literature is a poor guide for understanding why the role of legislatures in budgeting differs so fundamentally across countries. A number of quantitative cross-national studies use legislative institutions as explanatory variables, which is the topic of the following chapter. However, with few relevant exceptions (e.g. Pelizzo and Stapenhurst 2004; Lienert 2005), little attention has been given to legislative arrangements as dependent variables. With regard to legislative budget institutions more specifically, there are some interesting historical accounts of the evolution of financial scrutiny in particular countries (Stourm 1917; Coombes 1976; Schick 2002), but no structured review of broader patterns. One danger with the case study approach is to generalise on the basis of a small number of cases that may not be representative. For a long time, one serious obstacle to the study of cross-national differences in legislative budget institutions was the lack of comprehensive comparative data. Given the analysis in the previous chapter, this is no longer a reason to neglect the issue.