Assessing the Power of the Purse

Abstract

The requirement for legislative approval of financial measures is a democratic foundation stone that is enshrined in constitutions around the world. Despite this widespread formal recognition, the actual budgetary role of national legislatures apparently differs sharply across countries. Members of the US Congress ‘have long seen themselves as the bulwark against [executive] oppression’ and their ‘major weapon’ is the constitutional requirement for congressional approval of appropriations (Wildavsky and Caiden 2001: 10). Scholars and practitioners agree that the US Congress is a powerful actor that can have decisive influence on budget policy (Wildavsky 1964; Schick 2000; Meyers 2001). On the other hand, the budgetary influence of legislatures is said to be marginal in several other industrialised countries including France and the UK (Chinaud 1993; Schick 2002). Existing comparative work on legislative budgeting contributes selected country studies (Coombes 1976; LeLoup 2004), but lacks systematic analysis on the basis of a common framework. Moreover, while the literature on the US Congress is extensive, legislative budgeting in parliamentary systems and developing countries in particular remains understudied (Oppenheimer 1983). As a basis for more systematic comparative work, this chapter proposes and applies an index of legislative budget institutions that can be used to assess and compare the budgetary power of national legislatures.

This power over the purse may, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and salutary measure.

Publius, Federalist 58