From Amsterdam to Cologne (1997–99)
The final phase examined in this study brings a decisive breakthrough on the European level. The British government gives up its resistance against the creation of EU military capabilities for crisis management. This opportunity is seized by the government of German Chancellor Schröder which came into office in late 1998 and basically continued the policies of its predecessor. The evidence presented in this chapter suggests that the mounting structural pressures on the United Kingdom, which had become apparent already in the previous period, played an important role for the British policy change. The tension between British reluctance to build up more autonomous capabilities, on the one hand, and incentives to do so, on the other, was brought in sharp relief once again in the Kosovo crisis which may have tipped of (rather than genuinely caused) the British policy change. In contrast, German policies had given autonomy concerns much more emphasis from the beginning and thus were not under pressure to be adjusted. This will be demonstrated employing the procedures known from the previous chapters.
KeywordsSecurity Policy Incentive Structure Crisis Management British Government German Government
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