Explaining the Nationalisation of Party Systems in Central and Eastern Europe

Abstract

In the previous chapter, I have shown how party nationalisation might be measured. Later, in Chapter 6, party nationalisation will be used as an independent variable to explain why electoral systems in Central and Eastern Europe in some cases have led to different outcomes from those we would expect when using the common models. However, before employing party nationalisation in order to explain electoral system effects, the phenomenon itself will be explained. Two explanatory approaches for party nationalisation will be addressed and tested. Two recent books discuss these concepts as possible determinants of party nationalisation. The first, by Chhibber and Kollman (2004), investigates the phenomenon in four countries with single-seat electoral districts, namely Canada, India, the UK, and the USA. Using cross-country and time-series analyses, they come to the conclusion that party nationalisation is linked to the power distribution in states. If economic and political power lies with the central government, parties will be nationalised; if regional governments are strong, however, parties are less nationalised. This view has dominated most of the studies of party nationalisation. The second book, by Caramani, describes a process of ‘territorial homogenization of electoral behaviour, both electoral participation and the support for the main party families’ (Caramani, 2004, p. 1) over the past two centuries in Western European politics.