Abstract
Hume, in the Treatise of Human Nature rejects the thesis that morality is the province of reason — that it is the job of reason to reveal the moral truth, and then, via the will, to direct action, moderating and overriding the unruly influence of the passions. Hume announces — famously and shockingly — that
[r]eason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.
(T, 2.3.3.4/415)
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This essay draws heavily on Chapter 2 and parts of Chapters 3 and 8 of my 2005 book Value, Reality and Desire (Oxford, Oxford University Press). I wish to thank the editor for granting me permission to reprint material from the book here.
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© 2009 Graham Oddie
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Oddie, G. (2009). Experiences of Value. In: Pigden, C.R. (eds) Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Philosophers in Depth. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230281158_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230281158_6
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-30186-7
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