Abstract
Game theory is a collection of models designed to understand situations in which decision-makers interact. This article discusses models that focus on the behaviour of individual decision-makers. These models are sometimes called ‘non-cooperative’.
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Durlauf, S.N., Blume, L.E. (2010). Strategic and Extensive Form Games. In: Durlauf, S.N., Blume, L.E. (eds) Game Theory. The New Palgrave Economics Collection. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230280847_35
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230280847_35
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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