Abstract
In a mixed strategy equilibrium of a complete information game, players randomizs between their actions according to a particular probability distribution, even thougl they are indifferent between their actions. Two criticisms of such mixed strateg) equilibria are (a) that players do not seem to randomize in practice, and (b), if a playei were to randomize, why would he or she choose to do so according to probabilities that make other players indifferent between their strategies?
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Durlauf, S.N., Blume, L.E. (2010). Purification. In: Durlauf, S.N., Blume, L.E. (eds) Game Theory. The New Palgrave Economics Collection. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230280847_29
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230280847_29
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