Abstract
In traditional economic analysis, as well as in much of behavioural economics, the individual’s motivations are summarized by a utility function (or a preference relation) over possible payoff-relevant outcomes while his cognitive limitations are described as incomplete information. Thus, the standard economic theory of the individual is couched in the language of constrained maximization and statistical inference.
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Durlauf, S.N., Blume, L.E. (2010). Behavioural Economics and Game Theory. In: Durlauf, S.N., Blume, L.E. (eds) Game Theory. The New Palgrave Economics Collection. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230280847_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230280847_2
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