Abstract
Earlier literature on large (many players) cooperative games is surveyed in Aumann and Shapley (1974). For large strategic games, see Schmeidler (1973) and the follow-up literature on the purification of Nash equilibria. There is also substantial literature on large games with special structures, for example large auctions as reported in Rustichini, Satterthwaite, and Williams (1994).
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Durlauf, S.N., Blume, L.E. (2010). Large Games (Structural Robustness). In: Durlauf, S.N., Blume, L.E. (eds) Game Theory. The New Palgrave Economics Collection. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230280847_17
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230280847_17
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