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Games in Coalitional Form

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Game Theory

Part of the book series: The New Palgrave Economics Collection ((NPHE))

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Abstract

In their seminal book, von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) introduced two theories of games: strategic and coalitional. Strategic game theory concentrates on the selection of strategies by payoff-maximizing players, coalitional game theory concentrates on coalition formation and the distribution of payoffs.

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  1. University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA

    Steven N. Durlauf

  2. Cornell University, USA

    Lawrence E. Blume

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    Steven N. Durlauf

  2. Cornell University, USA

    Lawrence E. Blume

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Durlauf, S.N., Blume, L.E. (2010). Games in Coalitional Form. In: Durlauf, S.N., Blume, L.E. (eds) Game Theory. The New Palgrave Economics Collection. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230280847_13

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