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behavioural game theory

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Behavioural and Experimental Economics

Part of the book series: The New Palgrave Economics Collection ((NPHE))

Abstract

Analytical game theory assumes that players choose strategies which maximize the utility of game outcomes, based on their beliefs about what others players will do, given the economic structure of the game and history; in equilibrium, these beliefs are correct. Analytical game theory is enormously powerful, but it has two shortcomings as a complete model of behaviour by people (and other possible players, including non-human animals and organizations).

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Authors
  1. Colin F. Camerer
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Wisconsin-Madison, USA

    Steven N. Durlauf

  2. Cornell University, USA

    Lawrence E. Blume

Copyright information

© 2010 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited

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Camerer, C.F. (2010). behavioural game theory. In: Durlauf, S.N., Blume, L.E. (eds) Behavioural and Experimental Economics. The New Palgrave Economics Collection. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230280786_6

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