Abstract
For the longest time economists reacted allergically to preference formulations that allowed for anything but material self-interest (cf. Binmore, Shaked and Sutton, 1985). The reaction was well founded: by adding elements to the agent’s utility function, potentially one allows economic theory to explain everything and, therefore, nothing. Any behaviour can be explained by assuming it is preferred. However, this strong position has sometimes made economics seem out of touch with the world economists try to explain. Even economists care about the outcomes achieved by others, in addition to their own outcomes. Moreover, they also care about how those outcomes are achieved. Only in 1982, however, was the weakness of taking material self-interest for granted demonstrated by Werner Güth and his co-authors, who showed that economic theory failed in the simplest of decision settings (Güth, Schmittberger and Schwarze, 1982), the ultimatum game. In this game a first mover offers a share of a monetary ‘pie’ to a second mover who either accepts the proposal, in which case it is divided as proposed, or rejects the proposal, in which case both players earn nothing. Since then this game has become the workhorse of experimenters intent on exploring carefully the extent to which people behave in ways that are contrary to their material self-interest.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Bibliography
Andreoni, J. 1988. Why free ride? Strategies and learning in public good experiments. Journal of Public Economics 37, 291–304.
Berg, J., Dickaut, J. and McCabe, K. 1995. Trust, reciprocity and social history. Games and Economic Behavior 10, 122–42.
Bewley, T. 1999. Why Wages Don’t Fall During a Recession. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Binmore, K., Shaked, A. and Sutton, J. 1985. Testing noncooperative bargaining theory: a preliminary study. American Economic Review 75, 1178–80.
Blount, S. 1995. When social outcomes aren’t fair: the effect of causal attribution on preferences. Organizational Behavior & Human Decision Processes 62, 131–44.
Bowles, S. 2004. Microeconomics: Behavior, Institutions and Evolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Camerer, C. 2003. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments on Strategic Interaction. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Cameron, L. 1999. Raising the stakes in the ultimatum game: experimental evidence from Indonesia. Economic Inquiry 37, 47–59.
Carpenter, J. 2007. The demand for punishment. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 62, 522–42.
Carpenter, J., Burks, S. and Verhoogen, E. 2005. Comparing students to workers: the effects of social framing on behavior in distribution games. In Field Experiments in Economics. Research in Experimental Economics, ed. J. Carpenter, G. Harrison and J. List. Greenwich, CT and London: JAI/Elsevier.
Charness, G. and Rabin, M. 2002. Understanding social preferences with simple tests. Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, 817–70.
Cox, J.C. 2004. How to identify trust and reciprocity. Games and Economic Behavior 46, 260–81.
Eckel, C. and Grossman, P. 1996. Altruism in anonymous dictator games. Games and Economic Behavior 16, 181–91.
Falk, A., Fehr, E. and Fischbacher, U. 2003. On the nature of fair behavior. Economic Inquiry 41, 20–6.
Fehr, E. and Fischbacher, U. 2002. Why social preferences matter — the impact of non-selfish motives on competition, cooperation and incentives. Economic Journal 112, 1–33.
Fehr, E. and Gächter, S. 2000. Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. American Economic Review 90, 980–94.
Fehr, E. and Schmidt, K. 1999. A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 769–816.
Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S. and Fehr, E. 2001. Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment. Economic Letters 71, 397–404.
Forsythe, R., Horowitz, J., Savin, N.E. and Sefton, M. 1994. Fairness in simple bargaining experiments. Games and Economic Behavior 6, 347–69.
Geanakoplos, J., Pearce, D. and Stacchetti, E. 1989. Psychological games and sequential rationality. Games and Economic Behavior 1, 60–79.
Güth, W., Schmittberger, R. and Schwarze, B. 1982. An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 3, 367–88.
Hoffman, E., McCabe, K., Shachat, J. and Smith, V. 1994. Preferences, property rights, and anonymity in bargaining games. Games and Economic Behavior7, 346–80.
Sobel, J. 2005. Interdependent preferences and reciprocity. Journal of Economic Literature 43, 392–436.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2010 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Carpenter, J. (2010). social preferences. In: Durlauf, S.N., Blume, L.E. (eds) Behavioural and Experimental Economics. The New Palgrave Economics Collection. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230280786_31
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230280786_31
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-0-230-23868-8
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-28078-6
eBook Packages: Palgrave Economics & Finance CollectionEconomics and Finance (R0)