Abstract
Experimental work in auctions interacts with theory, providing a basis for testing and modifying theoretical developments. It has advantages and disadvantages relative to empirical work with field data, so that we view the two as complimentary. Experimental work is used increasingly as a test bed for new auction formats such as the Federal Communication Commission’s (FCC) sale of spectrum (air-wave) rights.
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Kagel, J.H., Levin, D. (2010). auctions (experiments). In: Durlauf, S.N., Blume, L.E. (eds) Behavioural and Experimental Economics. The New Palgrave Economics Collection. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230280786_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230280786_3
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