Abstract
Economic theory relies extensively on the assumption of perfect rationality, which makes it possible to construct general models with strong (and sometimes surprising) predictions. The evaluation of these models using field data requires the incorporation of random errors representing unobserved and omitted elements, measurement error, and so on. Evaluation of these models using data from laboratory experiments also requires an error structure, since choice behaviour in the laboratory is also noisy, showing clear mistakes and inconsistencies over time.
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Goeree, J.K., Holt, C.A., Palfrey, T.R. (2010). quantal response equilibria. In: Durlauf, S.N., Blume, L.E. (eds) Behavioural and Experimental Economics. The New Palgrave Economics Collection. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230280786_29
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