Abstract
The robustness of competitive market predictions stands as one of the most impressive results in experimental economics. Laboratory markets regularly generate competitive outcomes in environments populated by just two or three sellers. However, as in natural contexts, competitive outcomes do not always emerge. This article reviews results of laboratory markets in which price increases are driven by factors such as the exercise of unilateral market power or by collusion.
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Davis, D.D. (2010). market power and collusion in laboratory markets. In: Durlauf, S.N., Blume, L.E. (eds) Behavioural and Experimental Economics. The New Palgrave Economics Collection. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230280786_24
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230280786_24
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