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Abstract

In the decade preceding the war with China, the Indian military system underwent an important transition. The role of British officers in command and advisory functions dwindled. In April 1954 the air force got its first Indian chief of staff; as did the navy four years later. By the time the dispute with China came to the fore, the Indian armed forces were staffed entirely by Indian officers. In retrospect it is clear that this transition was not unproblematic. Not because Indian officers were in any way less capable than their British counterparts, but because several of them had less than adequate preparation for higher command particularly at the strategic level. Owing to the delayed “Indianization” of the officer corps during the Raj, the pool of Indian officers with the requisite experience had been limited. In consequence, several officers had had rapidly to climb up the chain of command in independent India’s armed forces.

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Notes

  1. C.B. Khanduri, Thimayya: An Amazing Life (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2006), 251.

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  5. Cited in Allen Whiting, The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1975, reprint 2001), 78.

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  6. Arthur Lall, The Emergence of Modern India (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), 155–7. A senior official in the ministry of defence, Lall was present during these negotiations. Also see “The Afterthoughts of Premier Chou,” Sunday Times, 19 December 1971.

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© 2010 Srinath Raghavan

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Raghavan, S. (2010). China 1961–1962. In: War and Peace in Modern India. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230277519_9

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230277519_9

  • Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-349-58988-3

  • Online ISBN: 978-0-230-27751-9

  • eBook Packages: Palgrave History CollectionHistory (R0)

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