Kashmir—1951 and After

Abstract

The Bengal crisis had a significant impact on the Kashmir dispute. Sheikh Abdullah, as Girja Bajpai observed, was “profoundly afifected” by the attacks on Muslims in India. This strengthened his belief that independence might be the best option for Kashmir, a development that not only led to misgivings in Delhi but also to differences with his colleagues in Kashmir. “Bakshi [Ghulam Mohammad] and … a majority of the members of the State Cabinet do not believe in Sheikh Saheb’s idea.” Nehru went to Kashmir and dissuaded Abdullah from taking this line.¹ But, in time, these differences—internal and with India—would widen into an unbridgeable chasm; for the Sheikh continued quietly to canvass this option. The refugee crisis also had an impact on Delhi’s stance vis-à-vis Kashmir: an overall plebiscite was now deemed thoroughly undesirable. As Vallabhbhai Patel wrote, “once the talk [of plebiscite] starts the non-Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir would start feeling uneasy and we might be faced with an exodus to India.”² Partition-cum-plebiscite now seemed the most practical option. The idea of electing a constituent assembly was also open.