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Theoretical Perspectives: Constructing an Analytical Framework

  • Kevin G. Cai
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Part of the International Political Economy Series book series (IPES)

Abstract

Scholars have developed a number of theories to explain economic regionalism in the postwar years. While the existing theories provide some intellectual insights on economic regionalism in one respect or the other, they could hardly explain a unique process and pattern of regional economic integration in East Asia that has developed since the mid-1980s. The analytical framework that is developed in this chapter is intended to explore economic regionalism in the world economy in general and regional economic integration in East Asia in particular. While the overall structure of this analytical framework is seminal, the approach is built on the basis of many insightful thoughts of contemporary international political economy theories with respect to economic regionalism, incorporating global (structural), regional and national factors into a unified analytical framework.1 As such, a review of major theoretic perspectives on economic regionalism is useful.

Keywords

Economic Regionalism Custom Union North American Free Trade Agreement Political Trust Trade Diversion 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

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