Introduction

Abstract

To anyone attempting to analyse and evaluate European policy vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli peace process, a remarkable paradox presents itself. On the one hand we have the European Union, an entity that creates not only an economic but also a political and security community among states that had battled each other for centuries, causing uncountable casualties and destruction. Nothing could be more different from today’s European Union than the semi-destroyed continent that emerged from the Second World War.

The Europeans will be unable to achieve anything in the Middle East in a million years.¹

(Henry Kissinger, former US Secretary of State, 1974)

Despite what is sometimes said, the Europeans do not want to interfere in the negotiations between the parties for the sake of appearing as another mediator. They want to help the parties to settle their differences in a way satisfactory for all. When we try to make our presence felt in the region, we do so in a way that will buttress peace efforts, not complicate them.²

(Miguel A. Moratinos, former EU Special Representative for the Middle East peace process, 1998)