Abstract
This chapter shows that under reasonable conditions, increasing gate revenue sharing among teams in a sports league will produce a more uneven contest, i.e. reduce competitive balance. This result has significant implications for antitrust authorities and legislators, who have tended to assume that revenue sharing arrangements will necessarily promote competitive balance.
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© 2010 Stefan Szymanski and Stefan Késenne
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Szymanski, S., Késenne, S. (2010). Competitive Balance and Gate Revenue Sharing in Team Sports. In: The Comparative Economics of Sport. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230274273_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230274273_7
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
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