Skip to main content

The Economic Design of Sporting Contests

  • Chapter
The Comparative Economics of Sport

Abstract

What is the optimal number of entrants in a race, or the optimal number of teams in a baseball league? What is the optimal structure of prizes for a golf tournament, or degree of revenue sharing for a football championship? How evenly balanced should the competing teams be in the NASCAR or Formula One championships? What is the maximum number of entrants per nation to the Olympic Games that should be permitted? What quota of qualifying teams to the soccer World Cup should be allocated to the developing nations?

I am grateful to Jeff Borland, Braham Dabscheck, David Forrest, Bernd Frick, Philippe Gagnepain, Brad Humphreys, Erik Lehmann, Stefan Késenne, Gerd Muehlheusser, Steve Ross, Rob Simmons, Peter Sloane, Paul Staudohar, Tommaso Valletti, Andy Zimbalist, the editor, and two anonymous referees for valuable comments. I also thank seminar participants at the ESRC study group on the Economics of Sport, Arts and Leisure, the Stockholm School of Economics, and Glasgow University for their observations. Errors are of course my own.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

eBook
USD 16.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Hardcover Book
USD 109.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Alexander, Donald. 2001. “Major League Baseball: Monopoly Pricing and Profit-Maximizing Behavior,” J. Sports Econ. 2: 4, pp. 341–55.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Andreff, Wladimir and Paul Staudohar. 2000. “The Evolving Model of European Sports Finance,” J. Sports Econ. 1: 3, pp. 257–76.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Atkinson, Scott; Linda Stanley and John Tschirhart. 1988. “Revenue Sharing as an Incentive in an Agency Problem: An Example from the National Football League,” Rand J. Econ. 19: 1, pp. 27–43.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baik, Kyung. 1994. “Effort Levels in Contests with Two Asymmetric Players,” South. Econ. J. 61, pp. 367–78.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baimbridge, Mark; Samuel Cameron and Peter Dawson. 1996. “Satellite Television and the Demand for Football: A Whole New Ball Game?” Scot. J. Polit. Econ. 43: 3, pp. 317–33.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Balfour, Alan and Philip Porter. 1991. “The Reserve Clause in Professional Sports: Legality and Effect on Competitive Balance,” Lab. Law J. 42, pp. 8–18.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baye, Michael; Dan Kovenock and Casper de Vries. 1994. “The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game When R>2: Mixed-Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates,” Public Choice 81:3–4, pp. 363–80.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baye, Michael; 1996. “The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information,” Econ. Theory 8: 2, pp. 291–305.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baye, Michael; 1999. “The Incidence of Overdissipation in Rent-Seeking Contests,” Public Choice 99, pp. 439–54.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Becker, Brian and Mark Huselid. 1992. “The Incentive Effects of Tournament Compensation Systems,” Admin. Sci. Quart. 37, pp. 336–50.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bernard, Andrew and Meghan Busse. 2000. “Who Wins the Olympic Games: Economic Development and Medal Totals,” NBER work. paper #7998.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Borland, Jeff. 1987. “The Demand for Australian Rules Football,” Econ. Record 63: 182, pp. 220–30.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Borland, Jeff and Jenny Lye. 1992. “Attendance at Australian Rules Football: A Panel Study,” Appl. Econ. 24, pp. 1053–58.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bourg, Jean-François and Jean-Jacques Gouguet. 2001. Economie du Sport. Paris: Editions La Decouverte.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buchanan, James. 1965. “An Economic Theory of Clubs,” Economica (Feb.), pp. 1–14.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bulow, Jeremy and Paul Klemperer. 2001. “The Generalized War of Attrition,” Amer. Econ. Rev. 89: 1, pp. 175–89.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Butler, Michael. 1995. “Competitive Balance in Major League Baseball,” Amer. Economist 39: 2, pp. 46–52.

    Google Scholar 

  • Buzzacchi, Luigi; Stefan Szymanski and Tommaso Valletti. 2003. “Equality of Opportunity and Equality of Outcome: Open Leagues, Closed Leagues and Competitive Balance,” J. Indust. Comp. Trade 3: 3, pp. 167–86.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cairns, John. 1987. “Evaluating Changes in League Structure: The Organisation of the Scottish Football League,” Appl. Econ. 19: 2, pp. 259–75.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cairns, John; Nicholas Jennett and Peter Sloane. 1986. “The Economics of Professional Team Sports: A Survey of Theory and Evidence,” J. Econ. Stud. 13, pp. 3–80.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cheffins, Brian. 1998. “Sports Teams and the Stock Market: A Winning Match?” UBC Law Rev. 32, pp. 271–91.

    Google Scholar 

  • Condon, Sir Paul. 2001. Report on Corruption in International Cricket. London: Anti-Corruption Unit, Int. Cricket Council.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cramton, Peter and Thomas Palfrey. 1990. “Cartel Enforcement with Uncertainty about Costs,” Int. Econ. Rev. 31: 1, pp. 17–47.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cymrot, Donald; James Dunlevy and William Even. 2001. “‘Who’s on First’: An Empirical Test of the Coase Theorem in Baseball,” Appl. Econ. 33, pp. 593–603.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cyrenne, Philip. 2001. “A Quality-of-Play Model of a Professional Sports League,” Econ. Inquiry 39, pp. 444–52.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dabscheck, Braham. 1975. “Sporting Equality: Labour Market vs Product Market Control,” J. Ind. Relat. 17: 2, pp. 174–90.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dabscheck, Braham. 1989. “Abolishing Transfer Fees: The Victorian Football League’s new employment rules” Sporting Traditions Nov. pp. 63–87.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dabscheck, Braham. 2000. “Sport, Human Rights and Industrial Relations,” Australian J. Human Rights, 6: 2, pp. 129–59.

    Google Scholar 

  • Daly, George. 1992. “The Baseball Player’s Market Revisited,” in Diamonds Are Forever: The Business of Baseball. P. Sommers, ed. Brookings Institution.

    Google Scholar 

  • Daly, George and William Moore. 1981. “Externalities, Property Rights, and the Allocation of Resources in Major League Baseball,” Econ. Inquiry 29, pp. 77–95.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dasgupta, Ani and Kofi Nti. 1998. “Designing an Optimal Contest,” Europ. J. Polit. Econ. 14, pp. 587–603.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Davies, Brian; Paul Downward and Ian Jackson. 1995. “The Demand for Rugby League: Evidence from Causality Tests,” Appl. Econ. 27, pp. 1003–1007.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Depken, Craig. 1999. “Free-Agency and the Competitiveness of Major League Baseball,” Rev. Ind. Org. 14, pp. 205–17.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dixit, Avinash. 1987. “Strategic Behavior in Contests,” Amer. Econ. Rev. 77, pp. 891–98.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dobson, Stephen and John Goddard. 1998. “Performance and Revenue in Professional League Football: Evidence from Granger Causality Tests,” Appl. Econ. 30, pp. 1641–51.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Downward, Paul and Alistair Dawson. 2000. The Economics of Professional Team Sports. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Duggan, Mark and Steven Levitt. 2002. “Winning Isn’t Everything: Corruption in Sumo Wrestling,” Amer Econ. Rev. 92: 5, pp. 1594–1605.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eckard, Woodrow. 1998. “The NCAA Cartel and Competitive Balance in College Football,” Rev. Ind. Org. 13, pp. 347–69.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eckard, Woodrow. 2001. “Free Agency, Competitive Balance and Diminishing Returns to Pennant Contention,” Econ. Inquiry 39: 3, pp. 430–43.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ehrenberg, Ronald and Michael Bognanno. 1990a. “Do Tournaments Have Incentive Effects?” J. Polit. Econ. 98: 6, pp. 1307–24.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ehrenberg, Ronald and Michael Bognanno. 1990b. “The Incentive Effects of Tournaments Revisited: Evidence from the European PGA Tour,” Ind. Lab. Relat. Rev. 43, pp. 74S–88S.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • El Hodiri, Mohamed and James Quirk. 1971. “An Economic Model of a Professional Sports League,” J. Polit. Econ. 79, pp. 1302–19.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ericson, Thomas. 2000. “The Bosman Case: Effects of the Abolition of the Transfer Fee,” J. Sports Econ. 1: 3, pp. 203–18.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • European Commission. 1998. “The European Model of Sport,” consultation paper of DGX.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fees, Eberhard and Gerd Muehlheusser. 2003. “Transfer Fee Regulations in European Football,” Europ. Econ. Rev. 47: 4, pp. 645–68.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fernie, Susan and David Metcalf. 1999. “It’s Not What You Pay, It’s the Way that You Pay It, and That’s What Gets Results: Jockeys’ Pay and Performance,” Labor 13, pp. 385–411.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fershtman, Chaim and Kenneth Judd. 1987. “Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly,” Amer. Econ. Rev. 77, pp. 927–40.

    Google Scholar 

  • Flynn, Michael and Richard Gilbert. 2001. “An Analysis of Professional Sports Leagues as Joint Ventures,” Econ. J. 111, pp. F27–F46.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Forrest, David and Robert Simmons. 2002a. “Outcome Uncertainty and Attendance Demand in Sport: The Case of English Soccer,” J. Royal Statist. Society, Series D (The Statistician), 51: 2, pp. 229–41.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Forrest, David and Robert Simmons. 2002b. “Team Salaries and Playing Success in Sports: A Comparative Perspective,” Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft 72: 4.

    Google Scholar 

  • Forrest, David, Robert Simmons and Patrick Feehan. 2002. “A Spatial Cross-Sectional Analysis of the Elasticity of Demand for Soccer,” Scot. J. Polit. Econ. 49: 3, pp. 336–56.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fort, Rodney. 2000. “European and North American Sports Differences,” Scot. J. Polit. Econ. 47: 4, pp. 431–55.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fort, Rodney and James Quirk. 1995. “Cross Subsidization, Incentives and Outcomes in Professional Team Sports Leagues,” J. Econ. Lit. 33: 3, pp. 1265–99.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fort, Rodney and James Quirk. 2000. “Owner Objectives and Competitive Balance,” work. paper, econ. dept. Washington State U.

    Google Scholar 

  • Frick, Bernd; Joachim Prinz and Alexander Dilger. 2001. “Pay and Performance in Professional Road Running: The Case of City Marathons,” mimeo, U. Witten.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fudenberg, Drew; Richard Gilbert; Joseph Stiglitz and Jean Tirole. 1983. “Preemption, Leapfrogging and Competition in Patet Races,” Europ. Econ. Rev. 22, pp. 3–31.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole. 1985. “Pre-Emption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technologies,” Rev. Econ. Stud. 52, pp. 383–402.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fudenberg, Drew and Jean Tirole. 1991. Game Theory. Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fullerton, Richard and Preston McAfee. 1999. “Auctioning Entry in Tournaments,” J. Polit. Econ. 107: 3, pp. 573–606.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gardiner Simon; Alexandra Felix; John O’Leary; Mark James and Roger Welch. 1998. Sports Law. London: Cavendish Pub.

    Google Scholar 

  • Garicano, Luis and Ignacio Palacios-Huerta. 2000. “An Empirical Examination of Multidimensional Effort in Tournaments,” mimeo, econ. dept. Brown U.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gavious, Arie; Benny Moldovanu and Aner Sela. 2002. “Bid Costs and Endoge-nous Bid Caps,” Rand J. Econ. 33: 4, pp. 709–22.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gradstein, Mark and Kai Konrad. 1999. “Orchestrating Rent-Seeking Contests,” Econ. J. 109, pp. 536–45.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Green, Jerry and Nancy Stokey. 1983. “A Comparison of Tournaments and Contests,” J. Polit. Econ. 91, pp. 349–64.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Grier, Kevin and Robert Tollison. 1994. “The Rookie Draft and Competitive Balance: The Case of Professional Football,” J. Econ. Behav. Org. 25, pp. 293–98.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gustafson E. and L. Hadley. 1996. “The Luxury Tax Proposal for Major League Baseball: A Partial Equilibrium Analysis,” in Baseball Economics: Current Research. Fizel, Gustafson, and Hadley, eds. Westport, CT: Praeger.

    Google Scholar 

  • Guttman, Allen. 1994. Games and Empires. NY: Columbia U. Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hall, Stephen; Stefan Szymanski and Andrew Zimbalist. 2002. “Testing Causality between Team Performance and Payroll: The Cases of Major League Baseball and English Soccer,” J. Sports Econ. 3: 2, pp. 149–68.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harris, Christopher and John Vickers. 1985. “Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of a Race,” Rev. Econ. Stud. 52: 2, pp. 193–209.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Harris, Christopher and John Vickers. 1987. “Racing with Uncertainty,” Rev. Econ. Stud. 54, pp. 1–22.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hart, R.A.; J. Hutton and T. Sharrot. 1975. “A Statistical Analysis of Association Football Attendances,” Applied Statist. 24: 1, pp. 17–27.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hess, Rob and Bob Stewart. 1998. More Than a Game: An Unauthorised History of Australian Rules Football. Melbourne U. Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Higgins, Richard; William Shughart and Robert Tollison. 1985. “Free Entry and Efficient Rent-Seeking,” Public Choice 46, pp. 247–58.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Higgins, Richard and Robert Tollison. 1990. “Economics at the Track,” in Sportometrics. Brian Goff and Robert Tollison, eds. Texas A&M U. Press, pp. 15–34.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hillman, Arye and John Riley. 1989. “Politically Contestable Rents and Trans-fers,” Econ. Politics 1: 1, pp. 17–39.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hoehn, Thomas and Stefan Szymanski. 1999. “The Americanization of European Football,” Econ. Policy 28, pp. 205–40.

    Google Scholar 

  • Horowitz, Ira. 1997. “The Increasing Competitive Balance in Major League Baseball,” Rev. Ind. Org. 12, pp. 373–87.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hovenkamp, Herbert. 1995. “Exclusive Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy,” Columbia Bus. Law Rev. 1.

    Google Scholar 

  • Humphreys, Brad. 2002. “Alternative Measures of Competitive Balance in Sports Leagues,” J. Sports Econ. 3: 2, pp. 133–48.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Husting, Alexandre. 1998. L’Union Europeene et le Sport. Lyon: Les Editions Juris Service.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hylan, Timothy; Maureen Lage and Michael Treglia. 1996. “The Coase Theorem, Free Agency, and Major League Baseball: A Panel Study of Pitcher Mobility from 1961 to 1992,” South. Econ. J. 62, pp. 1029–42.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Inglis, Simon. 1988. League Football and the Men Who Made It. London: Willow Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jennett, Nicholas. 1984. “Attendances, Uncertainty of Outcome and Policy in the Scottish Football League,” Scot. J. Polit. Econ. 31: 2, pp. 176–98.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Jones, J.C.H. and D.G Ferguson. 1988. “Location and Survival in the National Hockey League,” J. Ind. Econ. 36: 4, pp. 443–57.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kahane, Leo and Stephen Shmanske. 1997. “Team Roster Turnover and Attendance in Major League Baseball,” Appl. Econ. 29: 4, pp. 425–31.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kahn, Lawrence. 1993. “Managerial Quality, Team Success, and Individual Performance in Major League Baseball,” Ind. Lab. Relat. Rev. 46, pp. 531–47.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kahn, Lawrence. 2000. “The Sports Business as a Labor Market Laboratory,” J. Econ. Perspect. 14: 3, pp. 75–94.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Késenne, Stefan. 1996. “League Management in Professional Team Sports with Win Maximizing Clubs,” Europ. J. Sport Manage. 2: 2, pp. 14–22.

    Google Scholar 

  • Késenne, Stefan. 2000a. “Revenue Sharing and Competitive Balance in Professional Team Sports,” J. Sports Econ. 1: 1, pp. 56–65.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Késenne, Stefan. 2000b. “The Impact of Salary Caps in Professional Team Sports,” Scot. J. Polit. Econ. 47: 4, pp. 422–30.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Késenne, Stefan and Claude Jeanrenaud, eds. 1999. Competition Policy in Professional Sports: Europe after the Bosman Case. Antwerp: Standaard Eds.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kipker, Ingo. 2000. “Determinanten der Zuschauernachfrage im professionellen Teamsport: Wie wichtig ist die sportliche Ausgeglichenheit?” PhD dissert. Heinrich Heine U., Dusseldorf.

    Google Scholar 

  • Knowles, Glenn; Keith Sherony and Michael Haupert. 1992. “The Demand for Major League Baseball: A Test of the Uncertainty of Outcome Hypothesis,” Amer. Economist 36, pp. 72–80.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kuypers, Timothy. 1996. “The Beautiful Game? An Econometric Study of Why People Watch English Football,” Discus. Papers Econ. 96–01 U. College London.

    Google Scholar 

  • La Croix, S. and A. Kawaura. 1999. “Rule Changes and Competitive Balance in Japanese Professional Baseball,” Econ. Inquiry 37: 2, pp. 353–68.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lazear, Edward. 1989. “Pay Equality and Industrial Politics,” J. Polit. Econ. 97: 3, pp. 561–80.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lazear, Edward. 1995. Personnel Economics. MIT Press Cambridge: Mass.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lazear, Edward and Sherwin Rosen. 1981. “Rank Order Tournaments as Optimal Labor Contracts,” J. Polit. Econ. 89, pp. 841–64.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lee, Soonhwan and Hyosung Chun. 2001. “Economic Values of Professional Sport Franchises in the United States,” Sport J. 5:3 (an electronic journal: http://www.thesportJ.org).

    Google Scholar 

  • Levin, Richard; George Mitchell; Paul Volcker and George Will. 2000. The Report of the Independent Members of the Commissioner’s Blue Ribbon Panel on Baseball Economics. NY: Major League Baseball.

    Google Scholar 

  • Loury, Glenn. 1979. “Market Structure and Innovation,” Quart. J. Econ. 93, pp. 385–410.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lynch, James and Jeffrey Zax. 2000. “The Rewards to Running: Prize Structure and Performance in Professional Road Racing,” J. Sports Econ. 1, pp. 323–40.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McMillan, John. 1997. “Rugby Meets Economics,” New Zealand Econ. Papers 31: 1, pp. 93–144.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Maloney, Michael and Robert McCormick. 2000. “The Response of Workers to Wages in Tournaments: Evidence from Foot Races,” J. Sports Econ. 1, pp. 99–123.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Maloney, Michael and Kristina Terkun. 2002. “Road Warrior Booty: Prize Structures in Motorcycle Racing,” Contrib. Econ. Anal. Policy 1: 1.

    Google Scholar 

  • Marburger, Daniel. 1997. “Gate Revenue Sharing and Luxury Taxes in Professional Sports,” Contemp. Econ. Policy 15, pp. 114–23.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Marburger, Daniel. 2002. “Property Rights and Unilateral Player Transfers in a Multiconference Sports League,” J. Sports Econ. 3: 2, pp. 122–32.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mason, Tony. 1980. Association Football and English Society, 1863–1915. Brighton, UK: Harvester Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Meade, James. 1974. “Labor-Managed Firms in Conditions of Imperfect Competition,” Econ. J. 84, pp. 817–24.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Meyer, Bruce. 1995. “Natural and Quasi-Experiments in Economics,” J. Bus. Econ. Statist. 13, pp. 151–62.

    Google Scholar 

  • Moldovanu, Benny and Aner Sela. 2001. “The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests,” Amer. Econ. Rev. 91: 3, pp. 542–58.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Moldovanu, Benny and Aner Sela. 2002. “Contest Architecture,” discus. paper, U. Mannheim.

    Google Scholar 

  • Monahan, George and Matthew Sobel. 1994. “Stochastic Dynamic Market Share Attraction Games,” Games Econ. Behav. 6, pp. 130–49.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nalebuff, Barry and Joseph Stiglitz. 1983. “Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition,” Bell J. Econ. 14, pp. 21–43.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Neale, Walter. 1964. “The Peculiar Economics of Professional Sport,” Quart. J. Econ. 78: 1, pp. 1–14.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nitzan, Shmuel. 1994. “Modelling Rent Seeking Contests,” Europ. J. Polit. Econ. 10, pp. 41–60.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Noll, Roger. 1974. “Attendance and Price Setting,” in Government and the Sports Business. Roger Noll, ed. Washington: Brookings Institution.

    Google Scholar 

  • Noll, Roger. 2002. “The Economics of Promotion and Relegation in Sports Leagues: The Case of English Football,” J. Sports Econ. 3: 2, pp. 169–203.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Noll, Roger and Andrew Zimbalist. 1997. Sports, Jobs and Taxes. Washington: Brookings Institution.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nti, Kofi. 1997. “Comparative Statics of Contests and Rent-Seeking Games,” Int. Econ. Rev. 38: 1, pp. 43–59.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Orszag, Michael. 1994. “A New Look at Incentive Effects and Golf Tournaments,” Econ. Letters 46, pp. 77–88.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Owen, Dorian and Clayton Weatherston. 2002. “Professionalization and Competitive Balance in New Zealand Rugby Union,” mimeo, U. Otago.

    Google Scholar 

  • Palomino, Frederic and Joszef Sakovics. 2000. “Revenue Sharing in Professional Sports Leagues: For the Sake of Competitive Balance or as a Result of Monopsony Power?” mimeo, CentER discus. paper 2000–110, Tilburg U.

    Google Scholar 

  • Palomino, Frederic and Joszef Sakovics. 2001. “Inter-League Competition for Talent vs. Competitive Balance,” work. paper, CentER, Tilburg U.

    Google Scholar 

  • Peel, David and David Thomas. 1988. “Outcome Uncertainty and the Demand for Football: An Analysis of Match Attendances in the English Football League,” Scot. J. Polit. Econ. 35: 3, pp. 242–49.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Peel, David and David Thomas. 1992. “The Demand for Football: Some Evidence on Outcome Uncertainty,” Empir. Econ. 17, pp. 323–31.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Peel, David and David Thomas. 1997. “Handicaps, Outcome Uncertainty and Attendance Demand,” Applied Econ. Letters 4, pp. 567–70.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Piraino, Thomas. 1999. “A Proposal for the Antitrust Regulations of Professional Sports,” Boston U. Law Rev. 79: 889.

    Google Scholar 

  • Preston, Ian; Stephen F. Ross and Stefan Szymanski. 2001. “Seizing the Moment, a Blueprint for Reform of World Cricket,” work. paper, University College, London.

    Google Scholar 

  • Primault, Didier and Arnaud Rouger. 1999. “How Relevant is North American Experience for Professional Team Sports in Europe” in Competition Policy in Professional Sports: Europe after the Bosman Case. Stefan Késenne and Claude Jeanrenaud, eds. Antwerp: Standaard Eds.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quirk, James and Mohamed El Hodiri. 1974. “The Economic Theory of a Professional Sports League,” in Government and the Sports Business, Roger Noll, ed. Washington DC: Brookings Institution.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quirk, James and Rodney Fort. 1992. Pay Dirt: The Business of Professional Team Sports. Princeton: Princeton U. Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Quirk, James and Rodney Fort. 1999. Hard Ball: The Abuse of Power in Pro Team Sports. Princeton U. Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rascher, Dan. 1999. “A Test of the Optimal Positive production Network Externality in Major League Baseball,” in Sports Economics: Current Research. John Fizel, Elizabeth Gustafson and Larry Hadley, eds. Praeger, Westport CT.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roberts, Gary. 1984. “Sports Leagues and the Sherman Act: The Use and Abuse of Section 1 to Regulate Restraints on Intraleague Rivalry,” UCLA Law Rev. 32: 219, pp. 286–87.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roberts, Kevin. 1985. “Cartel Behaviour and Adverse Selection,” J. Ind. Econ. 33, pp. 401–13.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rosen, Sherwin. 1981. “The Economics of Superstars,” Amer. Econ. Rev. pp. 845–58.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosen, Sherwin. 1986. “Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments,” Amer. Econ. Rev. 76, pp. 701–15.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosen, Sherwin and Allen Sanderson. 2001. “Labor Markets in Professional Sports,” Econ. J. 111: 469, pp. F47–F68.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ross, Stephen F. 1989. “Monopoly Sports Leagues,” U. Minnesota Law Rev. 73: 643.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ross, Stephen F. 1997. “The Misunderstood Alliance Between Sports Fans, Players, and the Antitrust Laws,” U. Illinois Law Rev. 1997: 519.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ross, Stephen F. 1998. “Restraints on Player Competition that Facilitate Competitive Balance and Player Development and their Legality in the United States and in Europe,” in Competition Policy in Professional Sports: Europe after the Bosman Case. Stefan Késenne and Claude Jeanrenaud, eds. Antwerp: Standaard Eds.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ross, Stephen F. 2001. “Antitrust Options to Redress Anticompetitive Restraints and Monopolistic Practices by Professional Sports Leagues,” paper delivered to 2nd Annual Amer. Antitrust Inst. Conf.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ross, Stephen F. and Robert Lucke. 1997. “Why Highly Paid Athletes Deserve More Antitrust Protection than Unionized Factory Workers,” Antitrust Bull. 42: 3, pp. 641–79.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ross, Stephen F. and Stefan Szymanski. 2002. “Open Competition in League Sports,” Wisconsin Law Rev. 2002: 3, pp. 625–56.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ross, Stephen F. 2003. “The Law and Economics of Optimal Sports League Design,” work. paper, Business School, Imperial College, London.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rottenberg, Simon. 1956. “The Baseball Player’s Labor Market,” J. Polit. Econ. 64, pp. 242–58.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schmidt, Martin and David Berri. 2001. “Competitive Balance and Attendance: The Case of Major League Baseball,” J. Sports Econ. 2: 2, pp. 145–67.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Scully, Gerald. 1974. “Pay and Performance in Major League Baseball,” Amer. Econ. Rev. 64, pp. 915–30.

    Google Scholar 

  • Scully, Gerald. 1989. The Business of Major League Baseball. Chicago: U. Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Scully, Gerald. 1995. The Market Structure of Sports. U. Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Seymour, Harold. 1960. Baseball: The Early Years. NY: Oxford U. Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Siegfried, John and T. Petersen. 2000. “Who Is Sitting in the Stands? The Income Levels of Sports Fans,” in The Economics of Sports. W. Kern, ed. Kalamazoo: Upjohn Inst.

    Google Scholar 

  • Siegfried, John and Andrew Zimbalist. 2000. “The Economics of Sports Facilities and Their Communities,” J. Econ. Perspect. 14, pp. 95–114.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Skaperdas, Stergios. 1996. “Contest Success Functions,” Econ. Theory 7, pp. 283–90.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sloane, Peter. 1969. “The Labor Market in Professional Football,” British J. Ind. Relat. 7: 2, pp. 181–99.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sloane, Peter. 1971. “The Economics of Professional Football: The Football Club as a Utility Maximizer,” Scot. J. Polit. Econ. 17, 2, pp. 121–46.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Staudohar, Paul. 1996. Playing for Dollars: Labor Relations and the Sports Business. Cornell: ILR Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Staudohar, Paul. 1999. “Salary Caps in Professional Team Sports,” in Competition Policy in Professional Sports: Europe after the Bosman Case. Stefan Késenne and Claude Jeanrenaude, eds. Antwerp: Standaard Eds.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sugden, John and Alan Tomlinson. 1999. Great Balls of Fire. Edinburgh: Mainstream Pub.

    Google Scholar 

  • Szymanski, Stefan. 2001. “Income Inequality, Competitive Balance and the Attractiveness of Team Sports: Some Evidence and a Natural Experiment from English Soccer,” Econ. J. 111, pp. F69–F84.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Szymanski, Stefan. 2002. “Collective Selling of Broadcast Rights to Sporting Events,” Int. Sports Law Rev. 2: 1, pp. 3–7.

    Google Scholar 

  • Szymanski, Stefan. 2003. “Incentives and Competitive Balance in Team Sports,” Europ. Sport Manage. Quart. 3: 1, pp. 11–30.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Szymanski, Stefan. 2004. “Professional Team Sports Are Only a Game: The Walrasian Fixed Supply Conjecture Model, Contest Nash Equilibrium and the Invariance Principle,” J. Sports Econ. 5: 2, pp. 111–26.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Szymanski, Stefan and Stefan Késenne. 2004. “Competitive Balance and Gate Revenue Sharing in Team Sports,” J. Indust. Econ. LII: 1, pp. 165–77.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Szymanski, Stefan and Tim Kuypers. 1999. Winners and Losers: The Business Strategy ofFootball. London: Viking Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Szymanski, Stefan and Tim Kuypers. 2002. “Equality of Opportunity and Equality of Outcome: Static and Dynamic Competitive Balance in European and North American Sports Leagues” in Transatlantic Sport. Carlos Barros, Muradali Ibrahim, and Stefan Szymanski, eds. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

    Google Scholar 

  • Szymanski, Stefan and Tommaso Valletti. 2002. “First and Second Prizes in Imperfectly Discriminating Contests,” work. paper, Business School, Imperial College, London.

    Google Scholar 

  • Szymanski, Stefan and Tommaso Valletti. 2003. “Open and Closed Leagues,” work. paper, Business School, Imperial College, London.

    Google Scholar 

  • Taylor, Beck and Justin Trogdon. 2002. “Losing to Win: Tournament Incentives in the National Basketball Association,” J. Lab. Econ. 20: 1.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Taylor, Curtis. 1995. “Digging for Golden Carrots: An Analysis of Research Tournaments,” Amer. Econ. Rev. 85, 4, pp. 873–90.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tenorio, Rafael. 2000. “The Economics of Professional Boxing Contracts,” J. Sports Econ. 1: 4, pp. 363–84.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tirole, Jean. 1988. The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tullock, Gordon. 1980. “Efficient Rent Seeking,” in Toward a Theory of Rent Seeking Society. J. Buchanan, R. Tollison and G. Tullock, eds. Texas: &aM U. Press, pp. 97–112.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vamplew, Wray. 1988. Pay Up and Play the Game: Professional Sport in Britain 1875– 1914. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge U. Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Vives, Xavier. 1999. Oligopoly Pricing. MIT Press Cambridge: Mass.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vrooman, John. 1995. “A General Theory of Professional Sports Leagues,” South. Econ. J. 61: 4, pp. 971–90.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vrooman, John. 1996. “The Baseball Players Market Reconsidered,” South. Econ. J. 62: 3, pp. 339–60.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vrooman, John. 1997a. “A Unified Theory of Capital and Labor Markets in Major League Baseball,” South. Econ. J. 63, pp. 594–619.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vrooman, John. 1997b. “Franchise Free Agency in Professional Sports Leagues,” South. Econ.J. 63:July, pp. 191–219.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vrooman, John. 2000. “The Economics of American Sports Leagues,” Scot. J. Polit. Econ. 47: 4, pp. 364–98.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ward, Benjamin. 1958. “The Firm in Illyria: Market Syndicalism,” Amer. Econ. Rev. 48: 4, pp. 566–89.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weiler, Paul and Gary Roberts. 1998. Sports and the Law: Text, Cases, Problems. 2nd ed. Amer. Casebook Series, West/Wadsworth.

    Google Scholar 

  • Whitney, James. 1988. “Winning Games vs Winning Championships: Economics of Fan Interest and Team Performance,” Econ. Inquiry 26:October, pp. 703–24.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Zimbalist, Andrew. 1992. Baseball and Billions. NY: Basic Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zimbalist, Andrew., ed. 2001. The Economics of Sport. 2 vols. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

    Google Scholar 

  • Zimbalist, Andrew. 2003. May the Best Team Win: Baseball Economics and Public Policy. Washington: Brookings Institution.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Copyright information

© 2010 Stefan Szymanski

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Szymanski, S. (2010). The Economic Design of Sporting Contests. In: The Comparative Economics of Sport. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230274273_1

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics