Abstract
In every political system based on a market economy, the concept of property, and especially the legal institution of private property, plays a determining role. However, privatisation, increasing concentration, unequal distribution and internationalisation of property have created economic, political and social problems, which so far have defied solution. The creation of a ‘New Social Europe’ and the recent inclusion of no less than ten Eastern European states make the property question even more urgent. Financial participation (in the form of employee ownership as well as profit-sharing) based on an appropriate legal framework addresses these problems at their source. Instead of eliminating private property and thereby destroying the market economy, wage-dependent employees can be enabled to acquire productive property as shareholders in successful business corporations.
If then, we regard economic freedom as a good, our objective must be thus to restore property. We must seek political and economic reforms which shall tend to distribute property more widely until the owners of sufficient means of production … are numerous enough to determine the character of society.
Hilaire Belloc, The Servile State, 1913
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Notes
See H. Roggemann (1999a) ‘Functional Change in Property Rights in the Welfare State: Lessons from the Federal Republic of Germany’, in I. Collier, H. Roggemann, O. Scholz and H. Toman (eds) Welfare States in Transition — East and West (New York: St. Martin’s Press), pp. 25–40.
See L. Kelso and P. H. Kelso (1991) Democracy and Economic Power: Extending the ESOP Revolution through Binary Economics (Lanham, MD: University Press of America).
See J. Lowitzsch (2002) Privatisierung und Beteiligung in Mittelosteuropa — Am Beispiel des polnischen, slowakischen und tschechischen Modells [Privatisation and Capital Participation in Central Eastern Europe — The Example of the Polish, the Czech and the Slovak Model] (Berlin: Berlin Verlag Arno Spitz GmbH).
See F. Barjak, G. Heimpold et al. (1996) Management-Buyout in Ostdeutschland, (Halle: Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung).
For a recent, comprehensive overview of the positive economic evidence (especially for ESOPs) see J. R. Blasi, D. Kruse and A. Bernstein (2003) In the Company of Owners (New York: Basic Books)
’speaking one’s mind declines when property holding declines, and with it those who are free of necessity disappear from sight’, S. de Grazia (1962) Of Time, Work and Leisure (New York: The Twentieth Century Fund).
See H. Roggemann (1997a) Functional Changes of Property Rights in East and West — Comparative Remarks to Post-Socialist Transformation in Eastern and Western Europe, CERGE EI Working Paper (Prague: Charles University)
H. Roggemann (1997b) ‘On the Relation between Ownership and Privatisation in the Post-Socialist Countries’ in University of Split, Faculty of Economics (ed.) Enterprise in Transition II (Split: Faculty of Economics, University of Split), p. 193
H. Roggemann and J. Lowitzsch (eds) (2002) Privatisierungsins titutionen in Mittel-und Osteuropa (Berlin: Berlin Verlag Arno Spitz GmbH).
A. Pendleton, J. Blasi, D. Kruse et al. (2002) Theoretical Study on Stock Options in Small and Medium Enterprises, Study for the European Commission (Manchester: Manchester Metropolitan University Business School)
Price Waterhouse Coopers (2002) Employee Stock Options in the EU and the USA (London: PriceWaterhouseCoopers).
S. Chang (1990) ‘Employee Stock Ownership Plans and Shareholder Wealth: An Empirical Investigation’, Financial Management, Spring, pp. 48–58
The percentage of a company’s free cash flow which will be required to service the repurchase liability on average over a period of years is fairly constant unless the multiple of the company’s earnings (price/earnings ratio) alters dramatically. The average company will require cash equivalent to 7.5 per cent of the value of the allocated stock in the trust for repurchase liability purposes each year. This is equivalent to a 7.5 per cent dividend on the stock, but only on the stock already allocated to employee accounts in the trust. See L. Lyon (1989) The Repurchase Liability or the Phantom ofthe ESOP (San Francisco, CA: Menke & Associates, Inc.), p. 4.
See E. Poutsma and H. van den Tillaart (1996) Financiele werknemerspar-ticipatie in Nederland: tijd voor beleid! (The Hague: Nederlands Participatie Instituut).
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© 2009 Jens Lowitzsch
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Lowitzsch, J. (2009). The Building Block Approach to a Common European Model. In: Financial Participation of Employees in the EU-27. Studies in Economic Transition. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230274167_1
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230274167_1
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