Abstract
Britain’s nuclear capabilities continued to mature after 1961, although plans for their further development were curtailed in several ways. During the summer of 1962, a much reduced target stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons was agreed. Nuclear Seaslug and Blue Water were can-celled, and the decision was made to end the production of fissile material for use in weapons. Significant reductions in the workforce at Aldermaston were implied by these decisions, but AWRE’s services were still in considerable demand, especially when, after the Skybolt cancellation, new warhead designs were once again required. After September 1961, Aldermaston was able to plan on the resumption of nuclear testing. A significant British advance in implosion technology, known by the codename Super Octopus, became the basis for a nuclear device tested underground in Nevada in March 1962. A new family of war-heads was planned for use in Skybolt and WE177. At the end of the year, plans were again revised to take account of the Skybolt cancellation, and it was found that the new warhead technology could be modified for use in Polaris.
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Notes
Quoted in Alexis Tregenza, ‘How capable was the V-bomber force militarily of delivering Britain’s nuclear deterrent in the late 1950s and 1960s?’, RAF Air Power Review (2004), p. 123.
Roy Brocklebank, ‘World War III — the 1960s version’, Journal of Navigation 58/3 (Sep 2005), pp. 341–7.
Robert Dalsjö, Life-line lost: the rise and fall of ‘neutral’ Sweden’s secret reserve option of wartime help from the West (Santerus, Stockholm 2006), pp. 164–5. Allied bombers had similarly been permitted to overfly neutral Sweden during the Second World War (ibid., pp. 44–6). Somewhat curiously, LeMay was given Sweden’s highest military decoration, the Order of the Sword Commander Grand Cross, in 1962 or 1963 (Library of Congress, LeMay papers, box B151, folder Countries S-Z 1963).
Robert R Rodwell, ‘The steel in the blue: last week’s glimpse of the V-force’, Flight International 13 Feb 1964, p. 241. Estimates of range from low level range from 25 to 43 to 50 miles: Wynn, RAF strategic nuclear deterrent forces, p. 461;
Kev Darling, Avro Vulcan (Ramsbury, Crowood Press 2005), p. 128.
LtCdr Tony Dyson RN, HMS Hermes: a pictorial history (Liskeard, Maritime Books 1984); McCart, HMS Victorious 1937–69.
Robert Gardiner, ed. dir., Conway’s all the world’s fighting ships 1947–95 (Conway’s 1995), p. 500.
Beach and Gurr, Flattering the passions, p. 77; Anthony Verrier, quoted in John Garnett, ‘BAOR and NATO’, International Affairs 46/4 (Oct 1970), p. 676.
John Garnett, correspondence in International Affairs 47/1 (Jan 1971), p. 269.
From figures in PRO, ‘History of nuclear warhead production in UK’ of Jan 1963 and accompanying tables in AVIA 65/1792.
United States Defense Nuclear Agency, Operation Dominic I 1962, DNA 6040F, 1 Feb 1983, p. 198: http://www.dtra.mil/rd/programs/nuclear_personnel/docs/T24298.PDF (accessed Aug 2007).
Gibson and Buttler, British secret projects, pp. 128–30; brochures in PRO, WO 32/18891; Anon., ‘Blue Water’, Flight International 18 May 1961, pp. 657–8 and 2 Nov 1961, p. 703.
Kate Pyne, ‘Warheads and rockets: UK nuclear warheads for almost anything with a point at one end and a flame at the other’, presentation to the British Rocketry Oral History Project conference at Charterhouse, April 2003. Kate has elaborated further: ‘our lot [at Aldermaston] were gobsmacked at this — the thing was absolutely ready for production’ (pers. comm. 8 Jan 2008).
ibid., p. 66; J P McManus, A History of the FBM system (Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, 1989), p. E-24.
Kate Pyne, ‘More complex than expected: the AWRE’s contribution to the Chevaline payload’, The history of the UK strategic deterrent: the Chevaline programme, proceedings of the Royal Aeronautical Society conference on 28 Oct 2004, pp. G2–3.
Federation of American Scientists website: http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/nav/transit.htm (accessed Aug 2007); RAE Archive, Farnborough, G B Longden, ‘Polaris effectiveness and guidance’, Technical Report no. 67003 of Jan 1967 (with thanks to Roy Dommett).
RAE Archive, Farnborough, G B Longden, ‘Polaris effectiveness and guidance’, Technical Report no. 67003 of Jan 1967 (with thanks to Roy Dommett); John Coker, pers. comm. 21 Nov 2007. There is also a short account of these problems in Anon., ‘Polaris: the destroyer from the deep’, Flight International 22 Jul 1960, pp. 118–19.
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© 2010 Richard Moore
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Moore, R. (2010). Policy Execution 1961–64. In: Nuclear Illusion, Nuclear Reality. Nuclear Weapons and International Security since 1945. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230251403_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230251403_5
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