Abstract
Transaction cost theory has often been used to support the idea that information and communication technology (ICT) can reduce imperfection in the economic system. Electronic markets and hierarchies have repeatedly been described as solutions to inefficiencies in the organization of transactions in complex and uncertain settings. Far from criticizing this assumption, this paper highlights the limits associated with this application of transaction cost theory that has been prevalent in IS research. Building on the concepts first proposed by Ciborra, the paper argues that information-related problems represent only some of the elements contributing to transaction costs. These costs also emerge due to the interdependencies among the various factors contributing to their growth. The study of the consequences associated with ICT design and implementation, grounded in transaction cost theory, should therefore consider the overall implication ICT has on these interdependences and not only the direct effect it has on information flow, distribution and management.
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This paper originally appeared as Cordella, C. (2006) Transaction costs and information systems: does IT add up? Journal of Information Technology 21(3): 195–202.
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© 2009 Antonio Cordella
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Cordella, A. (2009). Transaction Costs and Information Systems: Does IT Add Up?. In: Bricolage, Care and Information. Technology, Work and Globalization. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230250611_19
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230250611_19
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