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Legal Form of Incorporation

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Organization and Development of Russian Business

Abstract

The Russian corporate sector went through a fundamental transition to a capitalist economy triggered by the collapse of the Soviet Union. As of 2005, private corporations accounted for about 65% of the country’s GDP, nearly 88.6% of its industrial production, and about 91.5% of its total employment (EBRD 2005; Rosstat 2007).1 Even though state control over “strategic industries” continues, the overwhelming dominance of state-owned enterprises in the Russian economy is already a thing of the past. In addition, in recent years, there have been a growing number of new market entries by private firms against the background of a remarkable economic recovery, and new small and medium-sized companies led by entrepreneurs of the new generation have been popping up one after another, tapping new markets by filling every niche in the national economy.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, Japan

    Ichiro Iwasaki

Authors
  1. Ichiro Iwasaki
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Institute for Industrial and Market Studies and Faculty of Economics, State University — Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia

    Tatiana Dolgopyatova (Chief Researcher, Professor) (Chief Researcher, Professor)

  2. Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, Japan

    Ichiro Iwasaki (Professor) (Professor)

  3. Institute for Industrial and Market Studies, State University — Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia

    Andrei A. Yakovlev (Director, Vice-Rector) (Director, Vice-Rector)

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© 2009 Ichiro Iwasaki

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Iwasaki, I. (2009). Legal Form of Incorporation. In: Dolgopyatova, T., Iwasaki, I., Yakovlev, A.A. (eds) Organization and Development of Russian Business. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230249493_4

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