Abstract
Tyler Burge (1973) argues for what he calls the ‘modified predicate view’ of proper names — the view that proper names are predicates in their own right. The view contrasts with the traditional predicate view according to which a name is an abbreviated or manufactured predicate; and it contrasts with the rather more popular view that names have the semantical role of individual constants.1 The modified predicate view is constituted by three central theses:
(T1) A proper name is a predicate true of an object if and only if the object was given that name in an appropriate way. (Burge 1973, p. 428)
(T2) Proper names in singular unmodified form, functioning as singular terms, involve a demonstrative element. (Burge 1973, p. 432)
(T3) A proper name occurring as a singular term in a sentence used by a person at a time designates an object if and only if the person refers to that object at that time with that proper name, and the proper name is true of that object. (Burge 1973, p. 435)
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© 2010 Sarah Sawyer
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Sawyer, S. (2010). The Modified Predicate Theory of Proper Names. In: Sawyer, S. (eds) New Waves in Philosophy of Language. New Waves in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230248588_11
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