Abstract
Sartre’s analysis of negation covers a number of complex phenomena and lies at the heart of his ontology. Crucially important, the choice of term is typically Sartrean: dramatic and insightful, but sometimes obscure. Moreover, the difficulty of trying to understand what is meant by ‘negation’ is compounded by the fact that it is closely tied in with what is said about nothingness. In fact, it seems to me that this double-barrelled negativity often gets commentators off on the wrong foot when they try to explain his idea. So, for instance, one writer notes that negation allows us to experience absence in a uniquely human fashion as lack or failure. Indeed, ‘it is because men are capable of being separated from the world that they are capable of having a language. The nature of the for-itself is such that it brings nothingness and hence negation and all that follows from it into the world.’1 Besides making a major assumption about the genesis of language, we are not told what precisely is meant by nothingness and why negation follows from it. In addition, it is never established that negation is, ontologically, first and foremost a manifestation of lack. And even if this were true, what is the precise mechanism that allows consciousness to experience lack as such? This question too is never answered.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Fell, J. P. (1979). Heidegger and Sartre: An Essay on Being and Place. New York: Columbia University Press.
Flynn, T. R. (1984). Sartre and Marxist Existentialism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hartmann, K. (1966). Sartre’s Ontology. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press.
Katz, D. (1950). Gestalt Psychology. Tr. R. tyson. New York: Ronald Press.
Köhler, W. (1947). Gestalt Psychology. New York: Liveright.
Laing, R. D. (1960). The Divided Self. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Levy, B.-H. (2003). Sartre: The Philosopher of the Twentieth Century. Tr. A. Brown. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Lewin, K. (1935). A Dynamic Theory of Personality. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Manser, A. (1967). Sartre: A Philosophic Study. New York: Oxford University Press
Mirvish, A. (1980). ‘Demystifying (part of) Being and Nothingness’. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 11, 3.
Mirvish, A. (1983). ‘Sartre on perception and the world’. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 14, 14.
Mirvish, A. (1984). ‘Sartre, hodological space, and the existence of others’. Research in Phenomenology 14, 149–73.
Mirvish, A. (1988–9). ‘Childhood, subjectivity and hodological space: reconstructing Sartre’s view of existential psychoanalysis’. Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry, 1–3.
Mirvish, A. (1991). ‘Bad faith, good faith, and the faith of faith’. In A. Aronson and A. van den Hoven, eds. Sartre Alive. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press.
Mirvish, A. (1995). ‘The presuppositions of Husserl’s presuppositionless philosophy’. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 24, 2.
Mirvish, A. (1996a). ‘Sartre: the ontology of interpersonal relations, authenticity and childhood’. Man and World, 29: 19–41.
Mirvish, A. (1996b). ‘Sartre and the problem of other (embodied) minds’. Sartre Studies International, 2.
Mirvish, A. (2001). ‘Sartre on constitution: Gestalt theory, instrumentality and the overcoming of dualism’. Existentia, XL
Mirvish, A. (2002). ‘Sartre on the ego’. Continental Philosophy Review, 35, 2.
Sartre, J-P. (1964a). No Exit and Three Other Plays. New York: Vintage.
Sartre, J-P. (1966). The Age of Reason. Tr. E. Sutton. New York: Knopf. (Original French publication: L’Age de raison. Paris: Gallimard, 1945.)
Sartre, J-P. (1972). The Psychology of Imagination. Tr. B. Frechtman. London: Methuen. (Original French publication: L’Imaginaire. Paris: Gallimard, 1940.)
Sartre, J-P. (1978). Iron in the Soul Harmondsworth: Penguin. (Original French publication: La Mort dans l’âme. Paris: Gallimard, 1949.)
Sartre, J-P. (1992). Notebooks for an Ethics. Tr. D. Pellauer. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. (Original French publication 1983.) Abbreviated NE in this chapter.
Wider, K. V. (1991). ‘A nothing about which something can be said: Sartre and Wittgenstein on the self’. In A. Aronson and A. van den Hoven, eds. Sartre Alive. Detroit: Wayne State University Press.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2010 Adrian Mirvish
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Mirvish, A. (2010). Sartre and the Lived Body: Negation, Non-Positional Self-Awareness and Hodological Space. In: Morris, K.J. (eds) Sartre on the Body. Philosophers in Depth. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230248519_4
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230248519_4
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-30517-9
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-24851-9
eBook Packages: Palgrave Religion & Philosophy CollectionPhilosophy and Religion (R0)