Abstract
This chapter explores three characteristics of the international system and their impact on the functioning of international law. Each of these characteristics, namely anarchy, balance of power and polarity, is rooted in neorealist theory and is particularly relevant to understand the implicit logic of self-defense in international relations.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
See Alfred Vagts and Detlev F. Vagts, “The Balance of Power in International Law: A History of An Idea,” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 73, No. 4, 1979, pp. 555–580. In this article, Vagts and Vagts discuss the different kinds of balance of power as distinguished by Inis Claude: “(1) balance as a descriptive term for an existing equilibrium of power; (2) balance as a condition of disequilibrium (as in a ‘favorable balance of power’ or a ‘reversal of the balance of power’); (3) balance as a policy of preserving a power equilibrium; (4) balance as a largely automatic system for restoring an equilibrium once disturbed; and (5) balance of power as a symbol for realism — ‘he-manness’ in the study of international relations.” (p. 557). They argue that the third conception of balance of power is the most pertinent for the discourse on international law.
Kenneth N. Waltz, “Neorealism: Confusions and Criticisms,” Journal of Politics and Society, Guest Essay, Vol. XV, Spring 2004, pp. 2–6, p. 5.
International relations theorists have utilized the term “international system” in varied manner. Goodman extrapolates three descriptive and theoretical implications of the term system. In the words of J.S. Goodman, “Usage One is System-as-Description. In Usage One, ‘system’ refers to an arrangement of the actors of international politics in which interactions are patterned and identifiable. Usage Two is System-as-Explanation. In Usage Two, ‘system’ refers to a particular arrangement in which the nature of the arrangement makes it the major variable to be considered in explaining the behavior of the actors in the international arena. Usage Three is System-as-Method. In Usage Three, ‘system’ refers to the application of special types of approaches, methodologies, or analytical concepts to the data of international politics.” Jay S. Goodman. “The Concept of ‘System’ in International Relations Theory,” Background, Vol. 8, No. 4, Feb. 1965, p. 257.
Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, “Anarchy and its Consequences” in Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis, International Politics: Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, 6th edition (New York: Longman, 2003), pp. 1–6, p. 1.
Quoted in Milner. Helen Milner, “The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique” in David A. Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 143.
Lea Brilmayer, American Hegemony: Political Morality in One-Superpower World (Yale University Press, 1994), p. 39.
Edward H. Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis 1919–1939 (London: Macmillan, 1940).
Der Derian (ed.), International Theory: Critical Investigations (New York: NY University Press, 1995), p. 75.
Robert Axelrod, and Robert Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy. Strategies and Institutions” in Oye, Kenneth A. (ed.), Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1986), p. 226.
Helen Milner, “The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique” in David A. Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 145.
Robert J. Art and Robert Jervis (eds), International Politics. Enduring Concepts and Contemporary Issues, 3rd edition (HarperCollins, 1992), p. 1.
Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism,” International Organizations, Vol. 42, No. 3, Summer 1988, pp. 485–507, p. 488.
John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994–1995), pp. 5–49, p. 7.
Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War (Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 237.
John H. Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, 2, No. 2 (January 1950), p. 157.
Andrew Butfoy, “Offence-Defence Theory and the Security Dilemma: The Problem with Marginalizing the Context,” Contemporary Security Policy, 18, No. 3 (December 1997), p. 45.
Helen Milner, “The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique” in David A. Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 145.
See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Edited with an Introduction by C.B. Mac-Pherson (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1651, 1968).
Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 6th ed. (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1948, 1985).
Niebuhr, Reinhold Moral, Man and Immoral Society (New York: Charles Scribner, 1932).
Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1513, 1985).
Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 209.
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983), p. 118.
Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 104.
Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 238.
Robert O. Keohane, “Realism, Neorealism and the Study of World Politics” in Robert O. Keohane (ed.) Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 14.
Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 160.
John J. Mearshiemer, “False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter 1994–95, pp. 5–49, p. 9.
Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism” in David A. Baldwin (ed.) Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 116.
John J. Mearshiemer, “False Promise of International Institutions,” International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter 1994–95, pp. 5–49, p. 8.
David A. Baldwin, “Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics” in David A. Baldwin (ed.) Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 4–8.
Helen Milner, “The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique” in David A. Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 158.
Helen Milner, “International Theories of Cooperation Among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses,” World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 3, 1992, pp. 466–496, p. 496.
Kenneth N. Waltz, “Neorealism: Confusions and Criticisms,” Journal of Politics and Society, Guest Essay, Vol. XV, Spring 2004, pp. 2–6, pp. 2–3.
Helen Milner, “The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique” in David A. Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 157.
Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Origin of War in Neorealist Theory,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. XVII, No. 4, Spring 1988, pp. 615–628, p. 619.
Helen Milner, “The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique” in David A. Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 167.
Lea Brilmayer, American Hegemony: Political Morality in One-Superpower World (Yale University Press, 1994), pp. 50–57.
Richard K. Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism,” International Organization, Vol. 38, No. 2, Spring 1984, p. 237.
Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 1979, pp. 95–96.
Ruggie, John Gerald, “Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis” in Keohane, Robert (ed.) Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press 1986), pp. 131–157.
Richard K. Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism,” International Organization, Vol. 38, No. 2, Spring 1984, pp. 225–285, p. 255.
Alexander E. Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory,” International Organization, Vol. 41, No. 3, Summer 1987, pp. 335–370, p. 339.
Robert W. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory” in Robert Keohane (ed.) Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 222.
Waltz, Kenneth N. Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 161–162.
Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Origin of War in Neorealist Theory,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. XVII, No. 4, Spring 1988, pp. 615–628, p. 615.
Bruce Russett and William Antholis, “Do Democracies Fight Each Other? Evidence from the Peloponnesian War,” Journal Of Peace Research, Vol. 29, No. 4, 1992, pp. 415–434.
Bruce Russett with Carol R. Ember and Melvin Ember, “The Democratic Peace in Nonindustrial Societies” in Bruce Russett, Grasping The Democratic Peace: Principles For A Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 99–118.
Bruce Russett and James Lee Ray, “Why the Democratic Peace Proposition Lives” (Response to Cohen 1994). Review Of International Studies, Vol. 21, No. 3, July 1995, pp. 319–323.
Bruce Russett and William Antholis, “Do Democracies Fight Each Other? Evidence from the Peloponnesian War,” Journal Of Peace Research, Vol. 29, No. 4, November 1992, pp. 415–434.
Bruce Russett, “A More Democratic and Therefore More Peaceful World,” World Futures, Vol. 29, No. 4, 1990b, pp. 243–263.
Michael W. Doyle, “Liberalism and World Politics,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4, December 1986, pp. 1151–1169.
Michael Doyle, “Michael Doyle on the Democratic Peace,” International Security, Vol. 19, Spring 1995, pp. 180–184.
James Lee Ray, Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace Proposition (University of South Carolina Press, 1998).
See John Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: Basic Books, 1989).
Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999).
Richard K. Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism,” International Organization, Vol. 38, No. 2, Spring 1984, pp. 225–85, p. 244.
Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Origin of War in Neorealist Theory,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. XVII, No. 4, Spring 1988, pp. 615–628, p. 615.
Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater (eds), Theories of International Relations (St. Martin’s Press, 1996), p. 13.
For an excellent discussion on “power,” see K.J. Holsti, “The Concept of Power in the Study of International Relations,” Background, Vol. 7, No. 4, 1964, pp. 179–194. Holsti describes power as containing several elements namely influence (a means to an end), capability (when an actor mobilizes its resources to influence another), Relationship (the act of power is also a relationship which over a period of time can be considered a process), and quantity (when compared to the power of another). Holsti argues “power may be viewed from several aspects: it is a means, it is based on capabilities, it is a relationship, and a process, and it can also be a quantity,” p. 182.
See Helen Milner, “The Assumption of Anarchy in International Relations Theory: A Critique” in David A. Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (Columbia University Press, 1993).
See Lea Brilmayer, American Hegemony: Political Morality in a One Superpower World, Yale University Press, Reissue Edition, September 25 1996.
See Arthur Stein, “Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World” in David A. Baldwin (ed.), Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 35. Stein, as other neorealists define dilemma of common interest as responsible for regime or institution creation. Dilemma of common interest is when “individualistic self calculation leads states to prefer joint decision making because independent self-interested behavior can result in undesirable or suboptimal outcomes.” Similarly, he defines dilemma of common aversion as the opposite!
Stein, Arthur (1993). Coordination and Collaboration: Regimes in an Anarchic World. In Baldwin, David A., ed. Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 47.
Joseph M. Grieco, “Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism” in David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 118.
Charles Lipson, “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs” in Baldwin, David A., ed. (1993). David A. Baldwin, ed., Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate (Columbia University Press 1993), p. 80.
See Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, “Achieving Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 1, 1985, pp. 226–254.
Holsti, K.J. Change in the International System: Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Relations (Edward Elgar Press, 1991), p. 236.
Morton A. Kaplan, “Balance of Power, Bipolarity and Other Models of International Systems,” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 51, No. 3, Sept 1957, p. 686.
Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983), p. 118.
Karl Deutsch and J. David Singer, “Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability,” World Politics, Vol. 16, No. 3, 1964, pp. 390–406.
William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1, Summer 1999, pp. 5–41.
Stephen M. Walt, “American Primacy: Its Prospects and Pitfalls,” Naval War College Review, Spring 2002, Vol. LV, No. 2, pp. 9–28.
Hedley Bull discusses the relationship of “Order” and “Justice” in world politics Discussing the institution of balance of power in international relations, Bull argues, “Here is an institution which offends against everyday notions of justice by sanctioning war against a state whose power threatens to become preponderant, but which has done no legal or moral injury; by sacrificing the interests of small states, which may be absorbed or partitioned in the interests of the balance; or — in the case of its contemporary variant, ‘the balance of terror’ — by magnifying and exploiting the risk of destruction. Yet this is an institution whose role in the preservation of order in the international system, in the past and at present, is a central one.” Hedley Bull, “Order versus Justice” in Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977), pp. 77–98, p. 91.
Kenneth N. Waltz, “Neorealism: Confusions and Criticisms,” Journal of Politics and Society, Guest Essay, Vol. XV, Spring 2004, pp. 2–6, p. 5.
Charles W. Kegley and Gregory A. Raymond, “Must We Fear a Post-Cold War Multipolar System?” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 36, No. 3, September 1992, pp. 573–585.
Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,” International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), p. 5. Modelski (1974) and Rapkin, Thompson and Christopherson (1979) operationalize polarity by their formula, “1. in a unipolar system, on state controls 50 percent or more of the relative capabilities that matter; 2. in a bipolar world, two states control at least 50 percent of the relative capabilities and each of the two leading actors possess at least 25 percent with no other state controlling as much as 25 percent; 3. in a multipolar system, three or more states each control at least 5 percent of the relative capabilities but no single state controls as much as 50 percent and no two states have as much as 25 percent apiece.”
William R. Thompson, On Global War: Historical-Structural Approaches to World Politics (Columbia, S. Carolina: University of South Carolina Press 1988), p. 209.
David Wilkinson, “Unipolarity Without Hegemony,” International Studies Review, Vol. 1, No. 2, Summer 1999, Prospects for International Relations: Conjectures About the Next Millennium, p. 142.
Samuel Huntington, “The Lonely Superpower,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 2, 1999, pp. 35–49.
Kenneth N. Waltz, “Neorealism: Confusions and Criticisms,” Journal of Politics and Society, Guest Essay, Vol. XV, Spring 2004, pp. 2–6, pp. 4–5.
Kenneth N. Waltz, “Evaluating Theories,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4, 1997, pp. 913–917, p. 915.
Ibid. pp. 913–917, p. 915. Also see, Kenneth N. Waltz, “America as a Model for the World? A Foreign Policy Perspective,” PS: Political Science & Politics, December 1991, pp. 667–670; Kenneth N. Waltz, “Letter to the Editor,” International Organization, Vol. 36, No. 3, Summer 1982, pp. 679–681.
Stephen M. Walt, “American Primacy: Its Prospects and Pitfalls,” Naval War College Review, Spring 2002, Vol. LV, No. 2, pp. 9–28.
Barren R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, “Competing Visions of US Grand Strategy,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996–1997, pp. 5–53, p. 6.
Excerpts From Pentagon’s Plan: “Prevent the Re-Emergence of a New Rival,” The New York Times March 8, 1992. The italized parts (emphasis added) also appear in Defense Planning Guidance 1992, tailored by Paul Wolfowitz, the US Under-Secretary for Defense Policy from 1989–1993 under George H.W. Bush. Quoted in Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, “Competing Visions of US Grand Strategy,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, Winter 1996/97, pp. 33–34.
William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1, Summer 1999, p. 9.
Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise,” International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4, Spring 1993, pp. 6–51.
Michael Mastanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and US Grand Strategy After the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4, Spring 1997, p. 56.
Steven M. Walt, The Origin of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press 1987), pp. 21–22.
Status quo states are the ones that do not challenge the current order, revisionist states aim towards a new international order by disrupting the current power distribution and “on the fence” states which are undecided in terms of their foreign policy orientations vis-à-vis the dominant power. Michael Mastanduno, “Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy After the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), p. 62.
Richard Falk, “New Approaches to the Study of International Law,” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 61, No. 2, April 1967, pp. 477 and 479.
The Case of the ‘SS Lotus’, 1927 PCIJ (ser A) No. 10, 18–25. p. 18. Also see Louis B. Sohn, “The Many Faces of International Law,” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 57, No. 4, Oct., 1963, pp. 868–870. H. Lauterpacht, “The Nature of International Law and General Jurisprudence,” Economica No. 37, Aug., 1932, pp. 301–320.
Alfred Von Verdross, “On the Concept of International Law,” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 43, No. 3, Jul., 1949, pp. 435–440.
Also see C. Joyner. The Reality and Relevance of International Law in C. Kegley and Witkopf (eds), The Global Agenda: Issues and Perspectives, 6th Edition (McGraw Hill, 2000), pp. 241–254.
And Henry C. Crocker, “The Codification of International Law,” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 18, No. 1, Jan 1924, pp. 38–55.
Payson S. Wild, “What is the Trouble with International Law?” The American Political Science Review, Vol. 32, No. 3, June 1938, pp. 478–494.
Charles W. Kegley and Gregory A. Raymond, When Trust Breaks Down: Alliance Norms and World Politics (University of South Carolina Press, 1990), p. 29.
Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, 2nd Edition (Council of Foreign Relations: Columbia University Press, 1979), pp. 24–25.
Anne-Marie Slaughter Burley, “International Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda,” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 87, No. 2 (April 1993), p. 217.
Hans Morgenthau, “Positivism, Functionalism and International Law,” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 34, No. 2, April 1940, p. 269.
Quoted in Richard A. Falk, “What Future for the UN Charter System of War Prevention?” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 97, No. 3, July 2003, pp. 590–598, p. 590.
Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5th Edition 1973, pp. 273–274.
Louis Henkin, How Nations Behave: Law and Foreign Policy, 2nd Edition (Council of Foreign Relations: Columbia University Press, 1979), p. 23.
Josef L. Kunz, “The Swing of the Pendulum: From Overestimation to Under-estimation of International Law,” The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 44, No. 1, January 1950, p. 140.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2009 Ruchi Anand
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Anand, R. (2009). International Relations Theory Meets International Law. In: Self-Defense in International Relations. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230245747_2
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230245747_2
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-36537-1
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-24574-7
eBook Packages: Palgrave Political & Intern. Studies CollectionPolitical Science and International Studies (R0)