Abstract
The contemporary philosophical arm of the animal rights or liberation movement effectively began in 1975 with Peter Singer’s book Animal Liberation.1 In this work, and in subsequent development of its ideas,2 Singer argues that the moral theory known as utilitarianism can be used to justify and defend the moral claims of non-human animals. According to utilitarianism, a morally good action is one which promotes or produces the greatest amount of pleasure, happiness, or satisfaction of desires, and Singer argues, quite forcibly, that such promotion requires abandoning such practices as animal husbandry, and experimentation upon animals for scientific or commercial purposes. Singer’s case for animal liberation, then, is anchored in his adoption of a utilitarian moral theory.
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Notes
Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (New York: The New York Review of Books 1975). Reprinted by Thorsons (1991). All page references are to the latter.
Peter Singer, Practical Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1980); ‘Utilitarianism and vegetarianism’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 9, 8 (1980); ‘Animals and the value of life’, in Matters of Life and Death, ed. T. Regan (New York: Random House 1980); ‘Killing humans and killing animals’, Inquiry 22 (1979); ‘All animals are equal’, Philosophical Exchange 1, 5 (1974).
Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: The University of California Press 1984). Reprinted by Routledge (1988). All page references are to the latter.
The following have also been influential: Stephen Clark, The Moral Status of Animals (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1977);
Mary Midgeley, Animals and Why They Matter (Harmondsworth: Penguin 1984);
S. F. Sapontzis, Morals, Reasons, and Animals (Philadelphia: Temple University Press 1987);
James Rachels, Created From Animals: The Moral Implications of Darwinism (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1990);
David deGrazia, Taking Animals Seriously (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1996).
Rosalind Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press); Michael Slote, Morals From Motives (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2001).
For a development of virtue ethical thinking particularly relevant to the case of animals, see Rosalind Hursthouse, Ethics, Humans and Other Animals (New York: Routledge 2000).
Peter Carruthers The Animals Issue: Moral Theory In Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1992).
John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1971). However, as I shall argue in Chapter 6, Rawls’s version of contractarianism is vitiated by several crucial unexpurgated Hobbesian assumptions.
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© 2009 Mark Rowlands
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Rowlands, M. (2009). Animal Rights and Moral Theories. In: Animal Rights. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230245112_1
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