Conclusion

Abstract

Our four main findings can be summarised as follows. Firstly, there existed an elite discourse on East Asia as a region, wherein opportunities lay for Russia to reassert itself as a great power. This belief was intertwined with the self-perception that Russia deserved to be a great power. Secondly, three major perspectives can be identified in this discourse — Eurasianist, Economic, and Multipolarity. These perspectives can best be interpreted as ‘causal beliefs’ which can realise the ‘principled belief’ in Russia’s great-power status. Thirdly, the initially disparate strands of Russia’s East Asia discourse under Yeltsin came together more under Putin as a result of his recentralisation of power and the marginalisation of dissenting voices. Under Putin, Russia’s great-power aim in East Asia became more clearly defined, and the Putin administration responded positively to those perspectives and policy implications that could contribute to this aim, especially in terms of building up economic strength. Fourthly, despite this convergence and emphasis by Putin on economic power, what kind of great power Russia would be and its precise role in the region remained unclear. While there was a natural elite consensus that Russia was or should once again become a great power, the means or policies to realise this aspiration remained contested among the elite, resulting in the continued lack of a coherent and well-defined East Asia strategy.