Abstract
In chapter 1 we encountered a simple form of reliabilism about knowledge, called process reliabilism. This held that knowledge is true belief that is formed via a reliable process, where a reliable process is one that tends to lead to true beliefs rather than false beliefs. We noted that process reliabilism cannot deal with Gettier-style cases, and hence that it cannot be a fully adequate account of knowledge, at least as it stands. Given that Gettier-style cases essentially trade on the anti-luck intuition — the intuition that knowledge involves a true belief that is not true simply as a matter of luck — it follows that process reliabilism cannot accommodate this platitude about knowledge.
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© 2009 Duncan Pritchard
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Pritchard, D. (2009). Virtue Epistemology. In: Knowledge. Palgrave Philosophy Today. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230242241_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230242241_4
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-0-230-01944-7
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-24224-1
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