Knowledge pp 52-71 | Cite as

Virtue Epistemology

  • Duncan Pritchard
Part of the Palgrave Philosophy Today book series (PPT)


In chapter 1 we encountered a simple form of reliabilism about knowledge, called process reliabilism. This held that knowledge is true belief that is formed via a reliable process, where a reliable process is one that tends to lead to true beliefs rather than false beliefs. We noted that process reliabilism cannot deal with Gettier-style cases, and hence that it cannot be a fully adequate account of knowledge, at least as it stands. Given that Gettier-style cases essentially trade on the anti-luck intuition — the intuition that knowledge involves a true belief that is not true simply as a matter of luck — it follows that process reliabilism cannot accommodate this platitude about knowledge.


True Belief Causal Explanation Process Reliabilism Virtue Epistemology Epistemic Luck 
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Copyright information

© Duncan Pritchard 2009

Authors and Affiliations

  • Duncan Pritchard
    • 1
  1. 1.University of EdinburghUK

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