Abstract
In this chapter we attempt to assess the results of Putin’s centralization and anti-corruption measures on the overall level of state capture in the Russian regions as well as on the balance of power between different interest groups. We proceed by, first, describing the results of previous research on state capture in Russia’s regions during Yeltsin in Section 2 and, then, analysing the changes in the nature and the level of state capture during Putin’s administration in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
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© 2009 International Economic Association
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Yakovlev, E., Zhuravskaya, E. (2009). State Capture: From Yeltsin to Putin. In: Kornai, J., Mátyás, L., Roland, G. (eds) Corruption, Development and Institutional Design. This is IEA Conference. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230242173_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230242173_2
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