Introduction: Questioning What Makes the EU Viable

Abstract

The sui generis interpretation dominant in mainstream European Union studies is often accompanied by a blithe assumption that the European Union (hereafter, the EU) has the political wherewithal and willpower to keep its show on the road.¹ Hailed as unique among international treaty organizations, it has even been described by one recent commentator as the embodiment of a ‘new European Dream’ that ‘dares to suggest a new history, with an attention to quality of life, sustainability, and peace and harmony’ (Rifkin, 2004: 6).² If deficiencies or deficits are identified in this polity, then it is usual to think there is an institutional solution: increasing the power of the European Parliament, turning the Council into a second parliamentary chamber, having a directly elected Commission president and so forth (Sidjanski, 1992: 436–8; Dehousse, 1997; van Gerven, 2005: 375–84). But whereas studies of the ‘democratic deficit’ reproduce these familiar, pious suggestions for improving the EU’s democratic credentials they shy away from discussing what impact they might have on the stability of EU politics. This book is precisely an attempt to assess the effects of institutional change, proposed for the sake of democratization, by identifying what makes the EU viable. In particular, the aim is to scrutinize how the EU political system has resolved various existential crises as the basis for examining what potential there is for greater centralization, in the name of democracy, of competences and representation at the EU-level. Furthermore, and more unusually, it is claimed that the best way of learning about EU viability is by contrast with the experience of political conflict between federal and state authority in the antebellum US.

Unity impossible, collapse improbable

Timothy Garton Ash (2001)