Abstract
In 1995 we proposed that certain aspects of grammatical development may be necessary for children to achieve understanding of other people’s false beliefs (J. de Villiers, 1995; de Villiers and de Villiers, 2000). In this chapter we review the theory on which the proposal was built, how the proposal itself has been modified over the years, and the empirical work that has addressed it. One of the risks of putting forth a strong proposal is that it will be wrong, but falsifiability is exactly its strength. At a certain point in the history of an idea, it can suffocate under the number of auxiliary hypotheses that must be marshalled to maintain it in the face of contradictory data. On the other hand, that is also the process whereby an idea gets theoretically refined. Deciding which is true in this case is the reader’s choice.
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© 2009 Jill G. de Villiers and Peter A. de Villiers
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de Villiers, J.G., de Villiers, P.A. (2009). Complements Enable Representation of the Contents of False Beliefs: The Evolution of a Theory of Theory of Mind. In: Foster-Cohen, S. (eds) Language Acquisition. Palgrave Advances in Linguistics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230240780_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230240780_8
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