Abstract
This chapter proposes to analyse the logic underlying the adoption of the OPT measure. The objective is to identify vested interests aligned in reaction to CEECs’ opening up. Enshrining into lawsuch an apparently anodyne mechanism – consisting as it does in discriminating between the imports of local producers and the ‘re-imports’ resulting from the relocation strategies of Community producers – has actually given rise to a complex bargaining process. Debate has revolved around the longrunning opposition between the advocates of protection and those who are favourable to free trade. It has involved numerous actors, and has taken place in various arenas: within domestic constituencies, between firms, federations of industry and labour unions, and at the European level, between virtually the same actors plus confederations of industries and of labour, member states and institutions of the Community participating in legislation-making at EU (Commission) level.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.
Buying options
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Learn about institutional subscriptionsPreview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 2001 Julie Pellegrin
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Pellegrin, J. (2001). The Politics of OPT. In: The Political Economy of Competitiveness in an Enlarged Europe. Studies in Economic Transition. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230236783_5
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230236783_5
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-41686-8
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-23678-3
eBook Packages: Palgrave Economics & Finance CollectionEconomics and Finance (R0)