Contesting Governance: Power and Politics in Judicial Reform in Argentina
This chapter discusses the contradictions between the a-political, financial missions of the IFIs and the intrinsically political nature of conditionality and more directly of governance. The case of judicial reform shows that governance reforms are less likely to be successfully implemented when the IFIs are reluctant or fail to engage in pro-reform networks. The failure to recognize local contestation and the importance of local actors in this reform area jeopardized the implementation of externally-led policy change since adverse power relations grew out of mistrust and competition. The present analysis of judicial reform in Argentina concludes that a project loan and its conditions may be agreed with government officials, but the process of reformation of policies and institutions is affected by the political, institutional and economic contexts in which actors’ incentives, ideas and policy paradigms can either favour or inhibit policy change. In other words, policy change should be the result of consensual arrangements with local actors which legitimize a political-economic programme supported by the World Bank, and where these actors are participants in the progress of the project implementation.
KeywordsLocal Actor Good Governance Local Expert National Plan Judicial System
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