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EMU and the Quest for Competitiveness

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The Future of EMU

Abstract

Standard lectures on costs and benefits of EMU cannot avoid touching upon the issue of whether the adoption of a single European currency, with the related loss of the exchange rate tool, has modified the competitiveness of the euro-area member states and in which way. Optimum currency area (OCA) and sustainable currency area (SCA) theories deal precisely with this question (see Chapters 1 and 3). This chapter addresses the problem of European competitiveness from a political science perspective focusing on the way in which the main socio-economic sectors within the most important EU member states have used the process of European monetary integration to enhance their competitive position not only in the European arena, but also in the global context.

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© 2009 Leila Simona Talani

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Talani, L.S. (2009). EMU and the Quest for Competitiveness. In: Talani, L.S. (eds) The Future of EMU. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230233898_8

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