Lessons from Regional Planning in France

Abstract

The objective of this book was to demonstrate that political leaders have considerable control over bureaucratic institutions, with a substantial ability to modify organizational structures and reorient bureaucratic activities towards their own political goals. The predominant interpretation of the relationship between leaders and institutions in the political science literature has been that political leaders have little autonomy relative to the constraints exerted by formal and informal institutions. Exceptions to this general rule of leadership weakness are widely accepted: exceptional leaders, or leaders profiting from exceptional situations, can change institutions (Edinger 1993: 67; Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 15–16). Such instances are often used to support a classification of political executives as, on the one hand, charismatic or anomalous leaders who overcome the constraints to make a profound impact on the polity, and the rest, mere ‘managers’ or ‘jugglers’ of the obstacles in their path.