Abstract
In the previous chapter an attempt was made to provide an account of the metaphilosophy of common sense, to present in schematic form what I called the common sense project, and to list a number of putative common sense beliefs. In this chapter I want to address the second of the principal tasks of the common sense project, namely, to provide an argument to justify the view that common sense beliefs ought to be treated as default positions. I have already argued, on what might be called “internal” grounds, that this distinctive approach to the business of philosophy makes sense given the nature of the philosophical enterprise. If strictly philosophical problems are co-ordination problems, then it behoves the philosopher to seek to resolve the tensions between reputable opinions while preserving as many of those opinions as possible. It also follows that common sense beliefs will have a greater claim on the philosopher than philosophical theories and arguments.
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© 2007 Stephen Boulter
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Boulter, S. (2007). The “Evolutionary Argument” and the Metaphilosophy of Common Sense. In: The Rediscovery of Common Sense Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230223134_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230223134_2
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-28063-6
Online ISBN: 978-0-230-22313-4
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